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Abstract
We analyze the effect of immigrants’ legal status on their consumption behavior using unique
survey data that samples both documented and undocumented immigrants. To address the
problem of sorting into legal status, we propose two alternative identification strategies as
exogenous source of variation for current legal status: First, transitory income shocks in the
home country, measured as rainfall shocks at the time of emigration. Second, amnesty quotas
that grant legal residence status to undocumented immigrants. Both sources of variation
create a strong first stage, and – although very different in nature – lead to similar estimates
of the effects of illegal status on consumption, with undocumented immigrants consuming
about 40% less than documented immigrants, conditional on background characteristics.
Roughly one quarter of this decrease is explained by undocumented immigrants having lower
incomes than documented immigrants. Our findings imply that legalization programs may
have a potentially important effect on immigrants’ consumption behavior, with consequences
for both the source and host countries.
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21. Introduction
The consumption behavior of immigrants is not only an important subject in its own right,
affecting the welfare of what constitutes now a large part of the population in many developed
countries, but it also impacts on evaluations of the effects of immigration. Through affecting
aggregate demand, immigrants’ consumption may influence prices and wages, leading
George Borjas (2013) to conclude that “consumption behavior of immigrants is a topic ripe for
empirical investigation”.2 Yet, while impressive progress has been made in many areas in the
economics of migration, consumption behavior of immigrants and the way it is affected by
immigration policies is surprisingly under-researched.
This paper attempts to fill this void. It is, to the best of our knowledge, the first to
investigate immigrants’ consumption behavior. Our focus is on one aspect that is in our view
particularly important: the way immigrants’ consumption responds to their legal status. The
share of undocumented immigrants in the overall foreign-born population in developed
economies has increased over past decades,3 and policies that regulate immigrants’ legal
status are at the core of the policy debate in many hosting countries.4 Legalization gives
2 In line with that, recent work by Dustmann et al. (2015) finds large employment effects of a labor supply
shock induced by a commuting policy. One way to reconcile this with findings of smaller employment effects in
other works is that consumption induced demand effects are an important component of the immigration impact on
local labor markets.
3 This share ranges from about 30% of the overall immigrant population in the U.S. (or 11.5 million in 2011,
see U.S. Department of Homeland Security, 2012) to 7.5%, 4.7%, 10.9%, and 15.1% in the UK, Germany, Spain,
and Italy, respectively (HWWI 2009; Fasani 2010a). Estimated yearly inflows are also large: Passel and Cohn
(2008) estimate that in 2008 alone, the U.S. received about 500,000 new unauthorized immigrants, while Jandl
(2004) estimates that a similar number entered the EU–15 in 2001 alone.
4 A number of theoretical and empirical papers investigate policies aimed at managing illegal entry of
immigrants or legalizing illegal immigrants, see, e.g., Ethier (1986); Chiswick (1988); Hanson and Spilimbergo
(1999); Chau (2001); Hanson et al. (2002); Woodland and Yoshida (2006); Hotchkiss and Quispe-Agnoli (2009);
Angelucci (2012); Bohn et al. (2014); Facchini and Testa (2014); and Chassamboulli and Peri (2015). See Hanson
3immigrants access to the regular labor market, as well as to tax benefit and health systems,
but it may also affect their consumption decisions – which is what this paper concentrates on.
One problem with the study of immigrants’ consumption behavior in relation to their legal
status is the availability of data that provides reliable measures of both. Our analysis is based
on a unique survey of both documented and undocumented immigrants residing in Italy over
the 2004–2007 period. One major advantage of this data is the information it includes on
consumption of immigrants, broken down by purpose, which is very rare. A unique feature is
the reliable construction of measures of legal status the data contains, which makes it
particularly suitable for our analysis.5 Besides that, Italy provides an ideal context for studying
the effects of immigrants’ legal status because its immigrant population has intensely
increased over the last two decades and unauthorized inflows of immigrants have played a
major role in this expansion. Moreover, immigrants arrive from a large and very diverse set of
origin countries, and Italy has a quota based system that allows for legalization – both aspects
that we will use for our identification strategy. Italy also deports a significant fraction of its
illegal population, and deportation efforts vary over time and across regions in a way that
individual immigrants are unlikely to foresee – which is another feature that we will use for
identification.
We address two important and relevant questions. First, what is the difference in
consumption behavior between the populations of immigrants living legally and illegally in the
country? Answers to this question are important to assess for instance the impact immigration
has on aggregate consumption, or on tax revenue through value added taxes. It should be
noted that this comparison includes the effect of endogenous sorting on the composition of
(2006) for a review of the literature on illegal migration from Mexico to the United States, and Orrenius and Zavodny
(2005) for analysis on the self-selection among undocumented immigrants from Mexico.
5 We define undocumented immigrants as immigrants who do not possess a regular residence permit and are
therefore not entitled to legally reside and work in the host country. We use the term “undocumented” as a synonym
for “unauthorized” and “illegal.”
4the two populations. Second, how will an exogenous change in residence status from illegal
to legal affect immigrants’ consumption behavior? Answers to this question are relevant for
e.g. the assessment of the economic impact of legalization programs. While the first question
can easily be answered by comparing the two populations in the data, the key methodological
problem in addressing the second question is the possible sorting of immigrants into legal
status.
We propose two alternative identification strategies to address this issue. Our first
strategy is based on the idea that higher levels of rainfall induce a positive and unexpected
temporary income shock that allows those who would like to emigrate to cover the cost of an
immediate illegal migration (rather than applying for the lengthy legal pathway). Drawing on
earlier evidence that shows that weather conditions affect income in developing countries
(see, e.g., Wolpin 1982; Paxson 1992; Miguel et al., 2004; Barrios et al., 2010; Brückner and
Ciccone 2011; Bazzi 2014) we use weather shocks at the time of emigration as an instrument
for legal status. We illustrate that these shocks have a strong effect on income in the
emigration countries we consider, and that higher than average levels of rainfall are strong
predictors of immigrants’ current legal status. We also show that our instrument is orthogonal
to immigrants’ other characteristics (suggesting that weather shocks do not affect the
composition of the immigrant population), and stronger for countries that are more specialized
in agriculture (where rainfall variations are important economic shocks), and in countries
where households are more likely to face binding financial constraints.
Our second strategy is based on yearly variation in quotas that allowed legalization of
resident illegal immigrants and that were introduced in the late 1990s (see Fasani et al., 2013).
We construct for each individual in our data a measure of the additional accumulated
“exposure” to amnesty quotas, induced by yearly variation away from the predictable trend.
Again this instrument is a strong predictor of current legal status. Based on different sources
of variation, these alternative IV strategies provide us with two independent possibilities to
identify the effect of illegal status on consumption behavior.
5Our results show that legal status has a strong effect on consumption: undocumented
immigrants consume about 40% less than documented immigrants, conditional on
background characteristics. Our IV estimates are throughout larger than OLS estimates and
remarkably similar across the two alternative IV strategies. About one quarter of the difference
in consumption results from undocumented immigrants having lower earnings: conditional on
household income, illegal immigrants consume about 30% less than legal immigrants.
There are different reasons as to why illegal immigrants may consume less (and save
more) than legal immigrants, conditional on income. Perhaps most importantly, legal status
may reduce future income risk, and therefore the amount of precautionary savings immigrants
accumulate. Illegality may also increase the probability that the migration will be terminated
prematurely, with migrants facing lower wages and employment probabilities back home,
which may lead to intertemporal substitution of leisure and postponement of consumption if
leisure and consumption are complements. Further, illegal status may create constraints and
costs that prevent individuals from completing certain transactions (e.g., purchasing a
registered motor vehicle, sign a contract to rent accommodation, obtain a mortgage) or using
formal saving channels (e.g., opening a bank account).
While we do not attempt to distinguish between these various channels, we provide
evidence that is consistent with illegal status imposing restrictions on certain types of
consumption. We further suggest an alternative estimation strategy based on variation in
deportation risk across spatial areas and over time that supports the hypothesis that
precautionary motives are one contributing factor in the lower consumption of illegal
immigrants.
The existing literature on the relation between legal status and immigrants’ labor market
outcomes relies predominantly on variation in legal status induced by the 1986 U.S.
Immigration Reform and Control Act (see, e.g., Borjas and Tienda 1993; Kossoudji and Cobb-
Clark 2002; Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2007; Amuedo-Dorantes and Mazzolari 2010; see Fasani
6(forthcoming) for a recent review of this literature).6 Our paper contributes to this literature by
suggesting two novel alternative identification strategies that avoid many of the problems in
previous papers that seek to identify the effect of illegality on immigrant outcomes.7 In addition,
we provide first analysis of the interplay between consumption behavior and legal status and
of the various channels along which consumption differs between the two populations.
Our paper also adds to the literature on precautionary savings.8 Considering immigrants’
legal status as a measure that is strongly correlated with the income risk households face, our
analysis addresses the sorting problem that bedevils that literature (see Browning and Lusardi
1996). Our findings are in line with results of Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln (2005), who
use a methodological approach similar to ours by exploiting differences in income risk between
workers in the public and private sectors using German reunification as an exogenous
reassignment of sector of employment.
Finally, we extend the use of weather shocks as a source of exogenous variation, a
method used by several other authors in different applications to study weather’s impact on
savings behavior, remittances, network size, migration, health, economic growth, democracy
6 The Immigration Reform and Control Act (IRCA) reformed the United States’ immigration law in 1986. It
granted amnesty to illegal immigrants who entered the United States before January 1, 1982, and had lived in the
U.S. continuously since that time. To the best of our knowledge, only few other papers (Kaushal 2006; Devillanova
et al. 2014; Mastrobuoni and Pinotti 2015; Pinotti 2015) study the relation between legal status and behavior based
on designs other than the IRCA reform.
7 Most of the papers in this literature study the IRCA reform using the same longitudinal survey of amnesty
applicants (the Legalized Population Survey, LPS) and all face similar limitations. First, using data on applicants
for the amnesty only may lead to ignoring endogenous selection into amnesty. Second, there is no obvious control
group in the LPS. Third, general equilibrium effects of a program that legalized 2.7 million individuals can confound
the estimates. Our strategy is not affected by these issues.
8 See, for example, Dynan (1993), Hubbard et al. (1995), Gourinchas and Parker (2001) and Fuchs-Schündeln
and Schündeln (2005). In the migration literature, Dustmann (1997) develops a model of return migration and
precautionary savings, showing that immigrants may have a higher income uncertainty and, therefore, engage in
more precautionary savings.
7and/or conflicts (see, among others, Paxson 1992; Munshi 2003; Miguel et al. 2004; Giles and
Yoo 2007; Yang and Choi 2007; Deschênes and Moretti 2009; Maccini and Yang 2009;
Barrios et al. 2010; Brückner 2010; Feng et al. 2010; Pugatch and Yang 2010; Brückner and
Ciccone 2011; Ciccone 2011; Dell et al. 2012; Bazzi 2014). We add to this literature by
demonstrating that temporary weather shocks are also a powerful predictor of immigrants’
legal status.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 addresses the relation between legal status
and immigrant’s consumption, discusses endogenous selection into legal status, and explains
our empirical strategy and instrumental variable approach. Section 3 provides relevant
background information on immigration to Italy and introduces our data. Section 4 reports our
empirical results. Finally, Section 5 discusses our findings and concludes the paper.
2 Consumption and Illegal Status
Our analysis focuses on immigrants’ consumption in the host country, and how it varies with
legal status. There are several reasons why illegal immigrants may have a different
consumption behavior than documented immigrants. Lacking legal status generally implies
being exposed to higher uncertainty about current and future earnings and may thus lead to
more savings for precautionary motives. Illegal status may also lead to inter-temporal
substitution of leisure: As an illegal migration may be terminated early through detection and
deportation,9 and low wages and employment opportunities at home could lead to
intertemporal substitution of leisure, so that leisure-consumption complementarities may lead
to lower consumption today (as in Heckman and MaCurdy 1980). Further, illegal status may
impose barriers to, and costs on consumption that prevent individuals from making specific
purchases (e.g., a registered motor vehicle or registered housing). All these channels point at
9 Over the period 2004-2007, the probability of deportation was 5% per year in Italy. In comparison, over the
same period this probability was close to zero in the U.S. (see Fasani 2010a, 2010b for Italy; Goyle and Jaeger
2005 for the U.S.).
8lower consumption of illegal immigrants in the host country (conditional on income). In
addition, consumption could be indirectly affected through the impact legal status has on
employment opportunities and earnings (see, e.g., Borjas and Tienda 1993; Kossoudji and
Cobb-Clark 2002; Kaushal 2006; Amuedo-Dorantes et al. 2007). In our analysis we will not
attempt to distinguish between these different mechanisms, which is beyond the possibilities
of the data we have available. We will however provide further evidence that precautionary
motives are likely to be one important reason as to why illegal immigrants consume less than
legal immigrants.
We will also refrain from investigating savings and remittances, due to both conceptual
issues and data limitations.10 Total savings consist of savings held in Italy as well as in the
home country, and we have no measure of the latter. Dustmann and Mestres (2010) show
that failing to take into account savings accumulated in the home country may severely distort
any conclusion on immigrants’ saving behavior. Remittances, instead, are a composite of
different transfers, with an overall ambiguous relationship to illegal status, including moneys
used to finance consumption of family members in the home country, to accumulate savings
at home, to invest into durable consumption- or investment goods, or to support the wider
village community (as insurance for a future return and re-integration). Further, our survey
asks migrants to report the average amount they send home each month. This measure may
systematically mis-measure remittances if transfers are less frequent, and if transfer frequency
differs by legal status (e.g. because illegal migrants have no access to official banking
channels). Documented migrants may, moreover, travel back home more frequently than
undocumented migrants and carry money with them in addition to (or rather than) sending
10 Consumption can be written as the difference between income earned in the host country ܻ, savings ܵ and
income transferred back to the source country (or remittances) ܴ: ܥ = ܻ− ܵ− ܴ.
9remittances. For all these reasons we do not believe that our measures of savings and
remittances can be related to legal status in a meaningful way.
In contrast, consumption in the host country is well measured in our data (see Section
3). It is an outcome that can be directly linked to individuals’ optimizing behavior and parameter
estimates have therefore a clear interpretation. Furthermore, our consumption measure is
related to a precise reference period, as respondents are asked about the average monthly
expenditure of their household in Italy for different groups of consumption items.
In our empirical analysis, we therefore estimate the following model:
ܥ௜௧= ߙ+ ߚܫ௜௧+ ܺ௜௧ᇱߛ+ ௖݂+ ௧݀+ ௜߳௧ (1)
where i is an index for the individual migrant, ܿ is the country of origin, and t is the year of
interview. The dependent variable ܥ௜௧ is the log of i’s monthly consumption in the host country,
and ܫ௜௧ is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the immigrant has illegal status. The vector ܺ௜௧ includes
individual controls of the respondent (gender, age, age squared, education level, years since
arrival, dummies for province of residence) and household characteristics (number of
household members living in Italy, a dummy for spouse living abroad, number of children living
in Italy and abroad, dummies for type of accommodation in the destination country). In Table
1, we provide detailed descriptive statistics for these variables. Country of origin fixed effects
and year of interview dummies are denoted as ௖݂and ௧݀respectively, and ௜߳௧ is an error term.
The parameter of interest is ߚ.
2.1 Identification
Estimation of (1) using OLS generates an estimate ߚ that measures the (conditional)
difference in consumption between legal and illegal immigrants who are living in Italy. It
combines the causal effect of legal status on consumption, and the effect through sorting of
immigrants into legal status. This composite parameter, although not causal, is nevertheless
important for policy when determining e.g. the difference in fiscal contributions, or the
differences in aggregate demand of the existing populations of legal and illegal immigrants.
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However, if interest focuses on the causal effect on consumption by exogenously changing
migrants’ legal status (e.g. to inform policy about the effect of implementing legalization
programs), one needs to eliminate the effect of sorting into legality. One such likely source for
sorting may be risk aversion. If immigrants who enter the country illegally are less risk averse
than those who enter legally, and if less risk averse individuals save less, then our estimate of
β is biased toward zero (see Dynan 1993 for a discussion of this bias).11 To address this, we
suggest two alternative estimation strategies, based on instruments that affect legal status at
two different stages: At the point when the migration decision is taken, and after having arrived
in Italy as an illegal migrant.12
More specifically, consider the current residence status ܫ௜௧ of migrant ݅at time ݐthat is
determined by status at entry (legal versus illegal) in period ݐ଴, ܫ௜௧బ, and opportunities of
obtaining legal status after arrival (between ݐ଴ and ݐ),ܮ௜௧ି ௧బ, as well as individual unobserved
characteristics ߤ௜:
ܫ௜௧= (݂ܫ௜௧బ,ܮ௜௧ି ௧బ,ߤ௜) (2)
Our identification strategy relies on plausibly exogenous variation that varies either ܫ௜௧బ
or ܮ௜௧ି ௧బ. To vary ܫ௜௧బ, we use shocks to income in the home country before emigration as
exogenous determinant of the initial decision of migrating legally or illegally. To vary ܮ௜௧ି ௧బ, we
employ variation in the opportunities for legalization in the host country that arise for each
immigrant after emigration and that is induced by accumulated yearly differences in
11 This case is similar to the problem of selection into self-employment (Skinner 1988; Guiso et al. 2002) or
public sector employment (Fuchs-Schündeln and Schündeln 2005): more risk averse workers may select into
occupations and sectors that imply lower income uncertainty. In that context, as in our case, occupational/sector
choice is endogenous, and failing to control for selection leads to a systematic underestimation of the importance
of reducing consumption for precautionary reasons.
12 Another issue in measuring behavior of immigrants is selective return migration (see Dustmann and Gorlach
(forthcoming) for discussion). In our data, there is no significant difference in return intentions between documented
and undocumented immigrants (results can be provided upon request).
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legalization quotas from a predictable trend. We now discuss these two strategies in more
detail.
2.2 Rainfall and Income Shocks
Individuals have two possibilities to migrate to Italy: Either legally, through a visa application,
or illegally. While the first option implies long waiting times, and may well be unsuccessful in
the end, the second option is immediate, but rather costly, so that credit constrained
individuals may be restrained from migrating through this route.13 A positive temporary income
shock may alleviate credit constraints of those who would want to emigrate but would rather
avoid the long and potentially unsuccessful legal route in favor for the illegal route,14 by being
able to afford an immediate illegal migration. If the destination country, moreover, offers
possibilities to obtain legal status after arrival, opting initially for an illegal migration can be an
effective, though more expensive, way of speeding up the process of becoming a legal
resident.
We use here rainfall shocks at the time of emigration as a temporary shock to income
that may potentially trigger an illegal migration and predict current residence status through
the persistence in legal status over time. The rationale for our instrument is that rainfall
generates income shocks by affecting agricultural production, thereby temporarily relaxing the
liquidity constraints that restrict migration. Most of the source countries included in our sample
13 Illegal migration implies far higher monetary costs as migrants have to compensate smugglers, buy forged
documents, pay border officials at home and abroad, etc. Existing evidence illustrates that the price paid by
undocumented migrants is substantially higher than the simple cost of the trip (see, e.g., Friebel and Guriev 2006;
Gathmann 2008; The Economist 2012). Recent UNODC data, for instance, show that the price for being smuggled
into the U.S. from Central America in 2009 was about $3.5 thousand for Central Americans, $7-7.5 thousand for
Africans and Indians and $45 thousand for Chinese (UNODC 2012).
14 Note that this will not affect potential migrants who already secured a legal entry to the destination country.
12
are highly dependent on agricultural production.15 Therefore, shocks to that sector are likely
to have an important impact on the livelihoods of large parts of the population, either directly
(by individuals working in that sector), or indirectly (by affecting sectors related to agriculture,
such as retail). Further, as rainfall shocks are transitory, and uncorrelated over time, they
should not affect permanent income, and therefore the more fundamental decision whether or
not to emigrate. As a consequence, they should not affect the overall population of potential
migrants – something we test in our empirical section.
We measure rainfall shocks using data from the NASA Global Precipitation Climatology
Project (see Adler et al. 2003), which provides monthly mean rainfall data on a 2.5°× 2.5°
latitude-longitude grid from 1979 onwards. Based on these data, we first compute the yearly
rainfall averages for each country of origin for the immigrants in our sample. We then match
each individual with the average yearly rainfall in the year of emigration (and in the previous
year) in the country of origin. As we condition on country fixed effects, which removes the
country-specific mean of rainfall, our rainfall measure is equivalent to using rainfall deviations
from the country mean and can be interpreted as a temporary “shock” to precipitation in the
home country in the period preceding migration.
We show below that rainfall in the year, and the year previous to emigration is indeed a
strong predictor of current legal status. We further demonstrate that our instrument is stronger
in countries with a larger agricultural sector and where the households are more likely to be
cash-in-advance constrained. Moreover, based on World Bank data on agricultural and total
income for a panel of almost 100 developing countries over the period 1979-2012 which we
15 Almost all the origin countries of immigrants residing in Italy are low and middle-income nations that are
highly dependent on the agricultural sector. According to World Bank data, over the 1995–2007 period, the sample-
weighted average share of agricultural employment for the 20 countries in our sample with the largest number of
immigrants (which accounts for 81% of our overall sample) is almost 41%, while the average share of agriculture
on GDP is about 19% (see online-Appendix Table A.1 for details). These numbers are roughly 10 times larger than
the OECD average (4% and 2%, respectively) and 6–8 times larger than those for Italy (5% and 3%, respectively).
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match to the GPCP data on rainfalls, we show that rainfall shocks have a strong impact on
per capita (agricultural) income.
2.3 Legalization quotas
Our second identification strategy relies on the accumulated exposure of immigrants to
deviations of yearly quotas to grant legal residence after their arrival in Italy.
In the late 1990s, Italy adopted a quota system that was meant to regulate the entry of
migrant workers to the Italian labor market. Since its introduction, however, the system has
been widely used to grant legal status to undocumented immigrants who reside in Italy (Fasani
et al. 2013; Pinotti 2015), as the Italian authorities are unable to discriminate between
applicants who apply from abroad, and who live unlawfully in Italy. At the end of each year,
the government issues a “flows decree” that establishes the number of immigrants that will be
allowed to enter the country in the following year for work reasons. The government should
choose the size of the quota – which can also be set to zero - based on forecasts of labor
market shortages and demand for foreign workers as well as availability of public and social
services at the local level (housing, schools, health services, etc.). Once the quotas are set, a
date is announced for employers to start filing applications to sponsor an immigrant.
Residence permits are then allocated to valid applications, in order of application receipt and
until the quota is reached. Quotas are usually lower than the number of applications filed. This
rationing of residence permits, in conjunction with unforeseen differences from year to year in
the number of total permits, generates randomness in granting legal status, as is well
documented in Pinotti (2015). As online-Appendix Table A.3 shows, quotas started in the late
‘90s at about 20 thousand working permits per year, increased gradually to almost 90
thousand in 2001 and decreased to 80 thousand in 2002-2004, only to increase again in 2005,
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reaching a peak of 550 thousand in 2006 and then dropping to 250 thousand in 2007.16
Besides “general” quotas, open to immigrants of any origin, there were also country-specific
quotas, allocated only to immigrants from certain origin countries. As online-Appendix Table
A.3 shows, over the period considered, three nationalities (Albania, Morocco and Tunisia)
were the primary beneficiaries of these country-specific quotas. As for total quotas, these
national-reserved quotas experienced substantial fluctuations over the period 1996-2007.
The underlying rationale for the instrument is that immigrants who were “exposed” to
larger quotas, and had the possibility to apply for legalization schemes over a longer period,
should be more likely to have acquired legal status. The identifying assumption is that quotas
set by the Italian government are orthogonal to migrants’ individual characteristics and affect
their consumption decisions only via the impact on immigrants’ legal status. To implement this
strategy, we therefore match each migrant in our sample with the total number of residence
permits offered through the quota system since arrival in Italy. More specifically, for each
immigrant, we compute the overall exposure to general residence permits offered by Italy to
which the individual has been exposed since arrival, ܳ௜௧ = ∑ ݍ௧்ିଵ௧ୀ௧೔బ , where ݐ௜଴ is the arrival
year of individual ,݅ ܶ− 1 is year before the interview, and ݍ௧ is the quota of residence permits
offered in year ݐ.17 We do not include in the summation the quota offered in the interview year
ܶ because it cannot affect the migrant’s legal status.18 Note that the total number of quotas an
individual is exposed to until interview differs for individuals who arrived at different dates, as
there is variation in the quotas over time. We illustrate that in online-Appendix Figure A.1,
16 In 2006, the Italian government initially set a quota of 170 thousand working permits but, once the
applications had been submitted, decided to legalize all valid applicants. Such a decision was unexpected and
unprecedented and it was never repeated in following years.
17 We discuss only the case of residence permits to which individuals from every country can apply. Extensions
to country specific permits are obvious.
18 The ISMU survey interviews take place in the spring of each year, while quotas are set and announced at
different dates each year. Furthermore, several months elapse between the beginning of the application window
and the actual granting of residence permits to successful applicants.
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which carries the log of total quotas on the vertical axis, and the year of arrival on the horizontal
axis, and where points are connected for total exposures to quotas for each of the four
interview years. Comparing points vertically in this figure refers to individuals of the same
arrival cohort who were interviewed in different years and thus exposed to different quotas.
Comparing points along upward sloping diagonals across lines refers to individuals with the
same residence in Italy, but who arrived in different years, and were therefore exposed to
different quotas. The connected lines decline over time because migrants who arrived later in
Italy had fewer opportunities to be legalized.
In our empirical strategy, we address the (unlikely) possibility that individuals are able to
predict future quotas in Italy. We assume that any such predictions are “rational” in the sense
that they can be expressed as linear projections of the implemented quotas to which an
individual is exposed to after arrival. We then use only the accumulated deviations of yearly
quotas from these expectations for identification. This amounts to using the residual of the
following regressions as an instrument:
݈݊ ܳ௜௧ = ଴ܽ + ଵܽ(ݐ− ݐ௜଴) + ௧݀+ ߱௜௧ (2)
where ݈݊ ܳ௜௧ is the (log of) total numbers of working and residence permits offered by the
Italian government since arrival date ݐ௜଴ of migrant ,݅ ݐ− ݐ௜଴ is the total number of years the
immigrant has resided in Italy, and ௧݀ are dummies for the interview year. The predicted
residual ෝ߱௜௧ is our instrument. We illustrate the residual variation that we use for identification
in online-Appendix Figure A.2.
To test the robustness of this identification strategy we also use two alternative
instrumental variable approaches. First, we assume that migrants have “adaptive”
expectations, in the sense that they predict future quotas after their arrival based on past
quotas observed up to the point of immigration. In particular, we assume that a migrant arriving
in Italy in year ݐ௜଴ expects the quota for that year and the following years to be equal to the
average quota observed until the year before migration. Our instrument is then the difference
between the actual cumulative quotas and the expected cumulative quotas, and captures the
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deviations in the policy from what the migrant has predicted before migrating, based on
observed past realizations of yearly quotas. Second, we exploit the heterogeneity across
nationalities in quotas and match citizens of the three main “privileged” countries to their
country-specific quotas, while all other immigrants are matched to the overall quotas (net of
national-reserved quotas).19 We maintain the assumption of “rational” expectations of future
quotas and use as instruments the residuals from separately estimating equation (2) for each
of the three privileged countries and for all the remaining countries pooled together. In our
estimations, all these strategies lead to similar results. We report therefore results using ෝ߱௜௧
as our main instrument, and results using the alternative instruments as robustness checks.
2.4 Parameter interpretation
The two instruments we propose – rainfall shocks in origin countries before migration and
unexpected legalization opportunities in Italy after migration - rely on entirely different
variation. They also identify two potentially different local causal parameters. Weather shocks,
by relaxing the budget constraint, identify a LATE effect of a population of “compliers” (those
who would have liked to emigrate legally but who were induced by a positive income shock to
choose the immediate illegal option).20 The quota instrument, by randomizing illegal
immigrants who are already residing in Italy into the pool of legal immigrants, identifies a “local”
effect for illegal “compliers” who have been exposed to legalization opportunities measured
19 Over the period 1996-2007, the Italian government granted two general amnesties (in 1998 and 2002) that
provided opportunities for legalization in addition to the quota system we have just described. We do not exploit
this additional source of exogenous variation in legal status because the instrument one could construct using
these amnesties (i.e. having arrived in Italy before 1998 or before 2002) is mechanically correlated with the duration
of residence in Italy (a control always included in our regressions).
20 In online-Appendix Section A2.1, we discuss the potential bias implied by using rainfall shocks as instrument
for legal status. In particular, we show that if positive shocks affect the overall pool of potential migrants, the IV
estimator will identify a lower bound (in absolute value) of the effect of being undocumented on immigrant
consumption.
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as the accumulated deviations from the trend of issued residence permits since year of arrival
in Italy. The two estimated parameters can, but do not need to be the same.
2.5 Household Income
While equation (1) is our main specification, it may also be of interest to determine how illegal
status affects consumption conditional on income. Our measure of income refers to overall
household income, which consists of various components, as we explain below (Section 3).
As for consumption, we use this measure by apportioning to individuals their share of
household income using an equivalence scale (see Section 3.1). One potential concern is that
this measure is potentially correlated with unobservables that affect also consumption. For
instance, as household income includes the household’s total hours of work, it may well be
that hours of work are correlated with unobservables that also affect consumption, or that
unobserved components that affect underlying wages are also correlated with consumption.
If income and legal status are correlated, any bias in estimates of the coefficient on income
will also affect the estimate of the impact of legal status on consumption.21
To address these potential concerns, we would need an additional instrument for
immigrants’ income. Since immigrants’ earnings are highly responsive to economic conditions
(Dustmann et al. 2010), one possibility is to exploit the exogenous variation in labor market
conditions across different provinces of residence and over time. In particular, we match each
immigrant to the unemployment rate in the province of residence in the interview year and use
this variable to instrument individual income (see Section 4.2.2). The exclusion restriction
assumes that changes in local unemployment rates affect immigrants’ consumption only
through disposable income.
3 Background, Data and Descriptives
21 Mismeasurement of monthly income is another concern.
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After Italy became a net immigration country in the late 1970s, its immigrant population initially
remained smaller than that of other European countries, with an immigrant share of 1% still in
the late 1980s (Del Boca and Venturini 2003). From the early 1990s onwards, however,
immigrant inflows increased dramatically, with much of it being undocumented. Between 1986
and 2002, different Italian governments granted five general amnesties that legalized almost
1.5 million unauthorized immigrants. As discussed in Section 2.3, a quota system was adopted
in the late ‘90s to regulate the legal entry of foreign-born workers. Over the years, family
reunification entries had also increased greatly. By 2008, the number of legal resident
immigrants was about 3.7 million or 6% of the total population. In the same year, the
undocumented immigrant population was around 650,000 or about 15% of the foreign-born
population (Fasani 2010a). Many of these illegal immigrants find employment in Italy’s large
shadow economy, which in 2003 accounted for about 26% of the official GDP, compared with
an average 16% and 9% for the OECD and U.S., respectively (Schneider 2005).
Being an unauthorized immigrant in Italy implies daily exposure to substantial
uncertainty, which may have effects on precautionary savings, being one factor that explains
the lower consumption of illegal immigrants. By law, all citizens are required to carry the
official Italian ID with them at all times, while immigrants must always carry their passport and
the documents proving the legitimacy of their residence in the country. Italy is an ethnically
homogenous country where immigrants can be easily recognized by officers who inspect
individuals routinely and apply racial profiling in doing so.22 The lack of a residence permit
prevents immigrants from having a legal working contract, accessing the welfare system (apart
from emergency care), or signing a house rental contract and confines them to employment
in the informal sector. Moreover, the probability of apprehension and removal of
undocumented immigrants is high. Over the 2004–2007 period, the time span covered by our
data, the average estimated population of undocumented immigrants was around 600
22 During the period under study (2004–2007), the Italian police report having checked and identified about 7–
9 million individuals each year, a very large number for a country that has about 59 million residents.
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thousand, with more than 90 thousand arrested and 26.4 thousand subsequently deported
each year (Fasani 2010a, 2010b). These figures imply an overall probability of apprehension
and deportation of 14% and 5% per year, respectively. For comparison, over the same period,
U.S. resident undocumented immigrants faced a 2% probability of being apprehended and a
negligible probability of removal (see Goyle and Jaeger 2005).
3.1 Data and Descriptive Evidence
Our analysis is based on a large and representative sample of both documented and
undocumented immigrants residing in Italy’s Lombardy region. Data are taken from an annual
survey run by the Institute for Multiethnic Studies (ISMU). This survey was launched in 2001
and administered to around 8,000 immigrants in each wave. Since 2004, it has included items
on household expenditure, savings, and remittances. For this analysis, we pool four survey
waves (2004–2007) to obtain a sample of 13,672 observations representing over 100 different
nationalities (online-Appendix Table A.1).23 Of the overall sample, 11,865 individuals are
documented immigrants and 1,807 are undocumented (Table 1). The data, which are detailed
in online-Appendix Section A.1, contain information on both the interviewee (e.g., gender, age,
employment status) and the household (e.g., number of members, accommodation, income,
consumption).
23 We eliminate from our sample all immigrants who are nationals of one of the New Member States (NMS)
that joined the European Union in 2004. Although Italy adopted transitional period restrictions that prevented NMS
nationals from legally working in the Italian labor market, these immigrants immediately acquired the status of
European citizens and the right of legal residency. Further, we restricted the sample to individuals with at most 10
years of residence in Italy to ensure common support between documented and undocumented immigrants (since
the latter group has substantially shorter average residence duration than the former; see Table 1). In online-
Appendix Table A.7, we show that our findings are very similar when the threshold varies from at most 5 to at most
15 years of residence in Italy (see Section 4.2.1).
20
The ISMU survey is specifically designed to elicit truthful reporting of legal status.24 We
construct three definitions of undocumented immigrants. The most restrictive definition
assigns the label “undocumented” only to those who reported not having a residence permit.
A second definition also covers those who reported having applied for amnesty but had not
yet received a response (1% of our sample). A third definition includes also all those who
reported being currently in the process of renewing their residence permit (5% of our sample),
which implies that they may not have had legal status at the time of interview. Based on these
alternative definitions, the share of undocumented immigrants in the estimation sample is
12%, 13%, and 18% respectively (see online-Appendix Table A.2). Throughout this paper,
unless otherwise noted, we use the second definition; however, we show that our results are
not sensitive to the definition adopted (see Section 4).
Table 1 provides summary statistics on individual and household characteristics for the
two groups. Undocumented immigrants are slightly younger than documented immigrants,
with a mean age of 31.6 (versus 33.3) years. Both groups have similar levels of education
(more than half of each group has received some secondary or tertiary education), and the
share of females is comparable (37% versus 42%). The household structure, however, differs
considerably: undocumented immigrants are more likely to be single (55% versus 33% among
documented immigrants) and less likely to have children (45% versus 58% among
documented immigrants). The average size of their household in Italy is smaller (1.4 versus
2.4 members) and those who are married or have children are more likely to have left their
24 To elicit truthful reporting of legal status, the interviews are anonymous, ask for no sensitive information
(e.g., addresses), and are carried out in public spaces by foreign-born interviewers (when possible, from the same
country as the interviewees) who emphasize the independence of the ISMU Foundation from any Italian
government body. The information on legal status is obtained by asking the immigrants about the type of legal
documents they have, starting with the most permanent (being an Italian citizen) and moving down to the option of
“no documents”. Online-Appendix Table A.2 shows how the question is structured.
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spouse (59% versus 25%) and children (84% versus 38%) abroad. The share of unemployed
individuals among undocumented immigrants is also twice as high as among documented
immigrants (8% versus 4%). On average, the undocumented immigrants in our sample have
been in Italy for about 2.7 years versus 5.8 years for documented immigrants. The last column
in Table 1 shows that most of these differences are statistically different at least at a 5%
significance level.
In the ISMU survey, each interviewee is asked to report average monthly expenditures
of their household in Italy for each of the following broad categories: (a) food, clothing, and
other basic needs; (b) housing; (c) other items (e.g., transportation, leisure, etc.). Our measure
for consumption in the host country is the sum of these three types of consumption
expenditure. Immigrants are also asked about the household’s average monthly expenditure
for remittances and average monthly savings. Our measure for total household income is then
computed as the sum of these five items.
Table 2 reports descriptive statistics on consumption and income of documented and
undocumented immigrants. As the ISMU survey collects information on total expenditure at
the household level, we obtain individual consumption (income) as the ratio between reported
household consumption (income) and the number of members of the household residing in
Italy (converted into “equalized adults” using the “modified OECD” equivalence scale).25 As
Table 2 shows, total net monthly household income is higher for documented than for
undocumented immigrants (815 versus 710 euros), as is consumption expenditure (581
versus 424 euros) and the share of income attributed to consumption (74% versus 65%).
25 The “modified OECD scale” is the official Eurostat equivalence scale. It assigns 1 to the first adult household
member, 0.5 to each additional adult member and 0.3 to each child. An alternative is the “standard OECD scale”
that assigns a value of 1 to the first adult household member, 0.7 to any further adult and 0.5 to each child.
Throughout our empirical analysis (see Section 4), we primarily use individual measures of consumption and
income obtained using the “modified OECD scale”, but we show that our estimates are robust to using the other
two alternative scales.
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Decomposing total household consumption into its three subcategories shows that the share
of consumption expenditure by documented (undocumented) immigrants is 39% (44%) for
food and clothes, 40% (31%) for housing, and 21% (25%) for “other” consumption goods. The
last column in Table 2 shows that all these differences are statistically significant at least at
the 5% level. These descriptive statistics suggest therefore not only that undocumented
immigrants consume less than documented immigrants, but also that the composition of
consumption expenditure between the two groups differs, with the largest difference in housing
expenditure.
4 Empirical Results
We now present our estimation results. We first discuss first stage estimates for our
instrumental variables (Section 4.1). In Section 4.2, we report OLS and IV estimates of our
main consumption equation.
4.1 First stage estimates
Rainfall shocks. Table 3 reports the results of Linear Probability Models of current illegal status
on log rainfall in the country of origin at the time of migration (with rainfall normalized by the
average within-country standard deviation in the sample).26 All regressions include a set of
“baseline controls” (interview year dummies, country of origin dummies and years since
migration) and cluster the standard errors by country of origin. Because we always condition
on country of origin dummies, rainfall levels can be interpreted as deviations from the country
means. Columns 1–3 show that rainfall shocks at the time of emigration ܶ and in the year
before migration ܶ− 1 are strong predictors of illegal status, whereas shocks in period T–2
are not significant once we condition on shocks in T and T–1. Further lags of rainfall shocks
are even smaller in magnitude and not significant. In column 4, we include individual controls
and we regress current illegal status on the mean of rainfall shocks in the immigration year (T)
26 Probit regressions provide very similar results.
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and previous year (T–1), as well as on rainfall shocks in the origin country at the time of the
interview (“current log rainfall”). While the former variable is strongly significant, the latter has
no predictive power. Estimates hardly change if we add further household controls and log
income in columns 5 and 6 of Table 3. Columns 7 and 8 show that our results are not sensitive
to the particular definition of undocumented immigrants (see online-Appendix Table A.2).
These results suggest that rainfall-induced income shocks in the year of emigration and
the year previous to that, but not in years further back or in the current year, affect illegal status
in Italy. According to the estimates in Table 3, a one standard deviation increase in the
precipitation level in the year of migration (the year before emigration) leads to a 3.2 (1.8)
percentage point increase in the probability of being an illegal resident in Italy.27 These effects
are interesting in their own right because they suggest the importance of weather conditions
in explaining illegal migration flows.
Not only is the first stage strong, with an F-statistic of about 40, but the estimated
coefficient on past rainfall shocks barely changes with the addition of further controls,
suggesting that observable individual and household characteristics are hardly correlated with
rainfall shocks in T and T–1. This suggests that rainfall shocks do not change the composition
of the migrant population – something we investigate in more detail in columns 9-11, where
we report results from a regression of predetermined personal characteristics at emigration
(log age, gender, and education) on rainfall shocks at the time of emigration, years since
migration and a set of dummies for interview year and country of origin (standard errors are
clustered by country of origin). Estimates suggest no significant relation between weather
shocks at the time of emigration and age, gender, or education.28 This is in line with the
27 The standard deviation is computed as the average within country standard deviation across all countries of
origin in our sample over the period 1979-2007.
28 Similarly, for the U.S. Munshi (2003) finds no significant relation between gender, age and education of
Mexican migrants and rainfall levels at the time of migration (see his footnote 33). There is evidence that risk
aversion is a strong correlate of some observable characteristics: women are found to be more risk averse than
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hypothesis that these shocks, while affecting the probability of illegal status, do not change
the overall composition of the pool of immigrants, at least not with respect to some key
observables that are typically correlated with risk aversion.29
The underlying rationale for our instrument is that rainfall provokes income shocks by
affecting agricultural production, thereby temporarily relaxing the liquidity constraints that
restrict migration.30 Our instrument should thus be stronger in countries with a larger
agricultural sector and where the households are more likely to be cash-in-advance
constrained. To investigate this conjecture, we rerun our first stage regressions but interact
the instrument (log rainfall in time T and T–1) with dummies that identify countries whose GDP
(or employment) share in agriculture is, respectively, above the 75th percentile or below the
25th percentile of the distribution of countries in our sample (columns 2 and 4 of online-
Appendix Table A.4). Estimates show that the effect of rainfall in countries with GDP
(employment) shares in agriculture above the 75th percentile is about 2 times larger than in
men (see, e.g., Borghans et al. 2009), risk aversion is higher among the least educated (Guiso and Paiella 2008)
and non-monotonically related to age (see Barsky et al. 1997).
29 Although these estimates suggest that rainfall shocks do not affect the pool of potential immigrants, in online-
Appendix Section A2.1 we discuss the consequences for the IV estimates when this condition is violated. In
particular, we show that if rainfall shocks select low risk averse individuals into the pool of potential migrants, the
IV estimates will be upward biased (similarly to OLS), and identify a lower bound (in absolute value) of the effect
of being illegal on consumption. The second assumption for our identification strategy is that, conditional on
observable characteristics and legal status, rainfall shocks at emigration have no effect on immigrants’ current
economic decisions either through weather shock persistence or through effects on later behavior. If there is
persistence in rainfall shocks, past rainfall shocks would be correlated with current shocks, which in turn would
affect behavior. In unreported regressions, however, we find no evidence for any persistence in rainfall shocks.
30 Other papers that establish a positive relationship between income shocks and migration include Bryan et
al. (2014) and Angelucci (2015). Dustmann and Okatenko (2014) show that the likelihood of an intention to migrate
increases with wealth in both Africa and Asia. McKenzie and Rapoport (2007) find that the probability of migration
is mostly increasing in household resources for households in communities with less developed migration networks,
likely to be the case in Italy due to its relatively recent immigration experience.
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the rest of the countries, although the effect of rainfall remains important also in countries with
a smaller agricultural sector; results remain unchanged even when we control for log GDP per
capita in the country of origin at the time of migration (columns 3 and 5). In columns 6 and 7
of online-Appendix Table A.4, we investigate more directly the role played by credit markets.
If credit markets are sufficiently developed, potential migrants (or their relatives) should be
able to borrow against their future earnings in the destination country (and/or some collateral
in the origin country) in order to finance the migration cost. We therefore expect the first stage
of our IV estimates to work better in countries with low levels of financial development.
Proxying financial market development by using the World Bank’s World Development
Indicator that estimates the credit provided by the domestic banking sector as a percentage
of GDP,31 we find that our instrument is stronger in countries that are financially less developed
– a finding that further supports our hypothesis that rainfall shocks relax budget constraints
that prevent individuals from migrating.
We further test the robustness of our first stage estimates to the exclusion of large
countries where our instrument is potentially less precise. After ranking the countries in our
sample according to their total land area, we have rerun our regressions and progressively
excluded the 10, 20, and 30 largest countries (columns 8-10 of online-Appendix Table A.4).
Estimates remain unaffected. In further robustness checks, we have tested for potential
heterogeneity in the effect of rainfall on legal status across different geographical areas,
showing that our instrument is relevant in all areas included in our sample (see online-
31 Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz (2009) use this variable as a proxy for financial development. The banking sector
includes monetary authorities and deposit money banks, as well as other banking institutions (savings and
mortgage loan institutions and building and loan associations) for which data are available. We match each
individual in our sample with the average size of the agricultural sector over the period 1995-2007 in their country
of origin (irrespective of their year of migration), and with the size of the banking sector in the year of emigration.
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Appendix Table A.6).32 As we discuss in Section 4.2.1, our estimates are also not sensitive to
the exclusion of major rainfall shocks.
To test the assumption that rainfall shocks generate indeed temporary income shocks
in the sending countries, we use World Bank data on agricultural and total income for a panel
of almost 100 developing countries over the period 1979-2012 that correspond to the countries
included in our main estimation sample (see online-Appendix Table A.1), and match to them
the GPCP data on rainfalls. In columns 1 and 2 of online-Appendix Table A.5, we report
regressions of agricultural income and total income per capita on the log of yearly rainfall,
conditioning on country dummies, year dummies and country-specific time trends, and we
cluster standard errors at the country level. In both regressions, the estimated coefficient on
log rainfall is positive and strongly significant, with a rainfall elasticity of agricultural income
and total income of about 0.2 and 0.03, respectively. Further, to determine whether rainfall
affects income through its effect on agricultural output, we regress the log of total income per
capita on the log of agriculture output, instrumenting agricultural output with log rainfall. We
report OLS and IV estimates in columns 3 and 4, and the first stage estimate in the second
panel in column 4. The agricultural output elasticity of income is about 0.24, while the first-
stage rainfall elasticity of agricultural output is about 0.13, with all coefficients being statistically
significant at the 1% level. These estimates therefore support our hypothesis that weather-
induced positive income shocks may relax credit constraints. 33
32 In online-Appendix Table A.6, we have estimated the same regression excluding each geographic area of
origin at a time (i.e., Sub-Saharan Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America, Middle East and North Africa, and Asia),
with very similar estimates across specifications (see columns 1-6). In column 7, we estimated our first stage
regression interacting (log) rainfall with dummies identifying each region in our sample. The estimated coefficients
on the interaction terms are all positive, similar in magnitude and statistically significant (with the exception of the
interaction for Latin America, which is in the same range than the other estimates, but imprecisely estimated).
33 Other papers find evidence of a positive effect of rainfall on income. For instance, using data from Sub-
Saharan African countries, Brückner and Ciccone (2011) show a rainfall elasticity of total income of about 0.07.
See also Miguel et al. (2004) and Barrios et al. (2010) for qualitatively similar results.
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Legalization quotas. In Table 4, we report first stage estimates of the quota instrument.
In Panel A, we use our main quota instrument, regressing illegal residence status on the
residuals of the log of total quotas obtained from estimating equation (2) (see Section 2.3).
Columns 1-4 gradually add controls, where all specifications condition on both years since
arrival in Italy and interview year dummies. Since we eliminate the systematic relationship
between time spent in Italy and accumulated quotas, the coefficient on the quota IV captures
the variation in accumulated residence permits off the accumulated linear trend. The estimated
coefficient on the quota variable is strongly significant, hardly changes across specifications
(which suggests that it is orthogonal to individual characteristics), and has the expected
negative sign: being “exposed” to larger accumulated deviations of quotas from their linear
trend since arrival in Italy reduces the probability of being illegal at interview. In particular, a
1% increase in the cumulative number of residence permits offered through the quota system
since arrival in Italy – corresponding to almost 6 thousand more places with respect to the
mean value in the sample - would imply a 0.3 percentage point lower probability of being
undocumented.34 Overall, estimates in Panel A of Table 4 show that accumulated residence
permits off the accumulated linear trend are a strong predictor of current legal status, with an
F-statistics of around 60.
In panel B of Table 4, we report first stage estimates from the alternative quota
instruments we describe in Section 2.3. We first report results using the difference between
actual and “expected” quotas, predicted under the assumption that immigrants have “adaptive”
expectations on future quotas. We then report results where we maintain the assumption of
“rational” expectations, but we split the instrument between country-reserved quotas and
general quotas (see Section 2.3). For the three major sending countries with reserved quotas
34 Our instrument varies by years since arrival in Italy (1-10) and interview year (2004-2007) and we cluster
the standard errors accordingly (i.e. 40 clusters). Clustering by country or origin – as in Table 3 – leads to slightly
smaller standard errors.
28
– Albania, Morocco and Tunisia (see online-Appendix Table A.3) – we match each migrant
with the residuals of the cumulative number of available slots in the national-specific quotas
(“country-reserved quotas”) since arrival in Italy, while we match migrants from all other
countries to the residuals of the cumulative non-restricted number of quotas (“non country-
reserved quotas”). In both cases, the instruments exhibit negative and strongly significant
coefficients, confirming the findings in Panel A. Overall, estimates in Table 4 show that the
quota system is a strong predictor of legal status, irrespectively of how we construct the
instrument.
4.2 Consumption and Illegal Residence Status
4.2.1 Total consumption
OLS estimates when regressing the log of individual monthly expenditure for consumption in
Italy on illegal residence status and baseline individual controls and household controls are
reported in the first two columns of Table 5. Estimates of the illegal status variable are negative
and strongly significant (at the 1% level), suggesting that undocumented immigrants’ total
consumption is about 25% lower than that of documented immigrants.
IV estimates that address endogenous selection into legal status are reported in
columns 3-12 of Table 5, where columns 3-4 use the rainfall instrument, columns 5-6 use the
quota instrument, and columns 7-8 use both rainfall and total quotas instruments. In columns
9-12, we use the alternative quota instruments we discussed before (see Section 2.3). For
each set of instruments, odd columns condition only on baseline and individual controls, while
even columns add household controls. IV estimates of the coefficient on illegal residence
status are all negative, strongly significant and larger in size (about 1.5-2 times larger) than
the corresponding OLS estimates reported in columns 1-2 of Table 5. The estimates are
remarkably stable across specifications, despite using two very different identification
strategies and alternative definitions of the instruments. The estimated coefficient on illegal
residence status is between -0.51 and -0.57, suggesting a 40%-45% lower total consumption
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of illegal immigrants. One reason for why IV estimates are larger than OLS estimates is that
less risk averse individuals tend to select into illegal migration (see online-Appendix Section
A2.1).
The next to last row of Table 5 reports the p-values from the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test,
which tests the null hypothesis that the OLS estimator is consistent and efficient against the
alternative that it is inconsistent, for each of the specifications we report. At the 10% level we
reject the null hypothesis for all but one specification. Further, when illegal residence status is
instrumented with more than one instrument (column 7-8 and 11-12), the last row of Table 5
reports the p-value from the Hansen overidentification test. In all cases, we fail to reject the
null hypothesis that the instruments are valid (i.e., uncorrelated with the error term).
We report alternative specifications and robustness checks in Table 6, where we
condition on baseline and individual controls.35 We report OLS estimates in Panel A, and IV
estimates in Panel B. Each row of Panel B refers to a different instrument set. As a reference
point, column 1 reports the estimates in the odd columns of Table 5.
We first test the robustness of our results to alternative measures of consumption. In
columns 2, we use the standard OECD equivalence scale to calculate individual consumption
from household consumption, while in column 3 we simply divide household consumption by
the unweighted number of household members in Italy. Our estimates are similar across these
different measures of individual consumption. Next, we use the two alternative definitions of
undocumented immigrants described in Section 3: columns 4 and 5 report estimates for the
more restrictive (Illegal2) and less restrictive (Illegal3) definition, respectively. Estimates are
again very similar to those of our main specification.
35 Conditioning on additional household controls delivers very similar estimates (as shown in Table 5).
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We show in Table 1 that 15% of the households of legal immigrants in our sample live
in their own house, while this is the case for only 1% of undocumented immigrants.36 Our
measure of total consumption includes housing expenditure and we always include among
the controls a dummy for home ownership. As a robustness check, we rerun our regressions
but with all homeowners excluded from the sample, which leaves us with 11,879 observations.
As column 6 in Table 6 shows, the estimated coefficients on the illegal residence status are
similar to those in Table 5. Finally, we restrict the sample to immigrants who report being the
only member in their household. For this subsample, consumption and income at the
household and at the individual level are the same. Although this restriction more than halves
the sample, size and significance of the estimated coefficients are again very similar to those
in previous specifications (see column 7 of Table 6).
In online-Appendix Table A.7, we report OLS (panel A) and IV (Panel B) estimates of
our main consumption equation, varying the residence threshold from at most 5 to at most 15
years. The estimates are remarkably stable across different thresholds. In online-Appendix
Table A.8 we test the robustness of our estimates to the exclusion of major rainfall shocks.
Again, OLS and IV estimates are hardly affected by imposing these restrictions on our sample,
while the rainfall instrument becomes even stronger when extreme rainfall shocks are
excluded.
The estimates presented so far suggest that undocumented immigrants consume
substantially less than documented immigrants, and that OLS estimation underestimates the
difference in consumption between the two groups. This is compatible with illegal immigrants
being less risk averse, leading to a bias towards zero in OLS regressions. While the previous
results refer to the overall impact of legal status on consumption behavior, one possible
channel may be that illegal immigrants have lower incomes, which in turn leads to lower
36 In Italy, undocumented immigrants cannot legally buy a house. Some of the undocumented immigrants may
however live in a house owned by another member of the household who is a legal resident in Italy.
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consumption. In fact, Table 2 points at such income differences between the two groups. We
now turn to analysis that investigates how much of the difference in consumption can be
accounted for by differences in income.
4.2.2 Consumption and Income
As we discuss in Section 2.5, one problem with income in a consumption equation is that the
same unobservables may affect both variables alike, which may lead to biased estimates. This
problem is exacerbated in our case, as we observe income only at the household level, and
we do not have a separate measure on wages and hours worked. If legal status and income
are correlated then this may lead to biased estimates in the legal status variable if income is
included in the consumption equation. To address this problem we use an IV strategy (outlined
in Section 2.5), using local unemployment rates in the province of residence as instrument for
immigrants’ income. As income itself may depend on legal status, the first stage equation will
include also the two instruments for illegal status.
We report the first stage estimates from regressing log monthly income (obtained by
dividing household income by the number of “equalized” adults using the modified OECD
scale) on provincial unemployment rates and other controls in online-Appendix Table A.9.37
We condition on province and year dummies, and gradually add individual and household
controls. We also include (the log of) provincial GDP per capita to keep other macro conditions
constant. In columns 4-9 of online-Appendix Table A.9, we include in addition the rainfall and
quota instruments (individually and jointly) that we use to instrument illegal residence status.
These specifications are precisely the first stage estimates when both residence status and
income are treated as endogenous variables in the consumption equation (see Table 7).
Estimates in online-Appendix Table A.9 show that the unemployment rate in the province of
37 Our measure of income captures individual current income. In addition, all our regressions always include
individual controls of the respondents (such as age, gender and education), which are potentially better measures
of permanent income.
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residence is a strong predictor of immigrants’ income, significant at the 1% level with an F-
statistics of around 10. In terms of magnitude, a one-percentage point increase in
unemployment leads to a 5%-6% reduction in immigrants’ income. As a benchmark, the
unemployment rate was about 3.7% in the Lombardy region between 2004 and 2007.38
We report estimates of the effect of illegal status conditional on income on monthly total
consumption in Table 7. When conditioning on income, the OLS estimate decreases (in
absolute value) but remains strongly significant (column 1), suggesting that about half of the
difference in consumption between legal and illegal immigrants results from illegal immigrants
having lower income. The implied income elasticity of consumption is about 0.77.
IV estimates are reported in columns 2-7 of Table 7. In all these regressions, we treat
illegal residence status as endogenous and present estimates using rainfall shocks (columns
2-3), total quotas (columns 4-5), and both (columns 6-7) as instruments. In columns 3, 5 and
7, we further instrument (log) income. When instrumenting only legal status (columns 2, 4 and
6), the estimated coefficient on this latter variable increases (in absolute value) with respect
to the OLS coefficient reported in column 1, suggesting that undocumented immigrants
consume about 20%-25% less than documented immigrants, conditional on income. However,
when instrumenting income as well, the coefficient on illegal status increases, implying now
that illegal immigrants’ consumption is about 28%-32% lower than that of legal immigrants.
Further, the estimated elasticity of consumption to household income drops from 0.7 to 0.4
when the latter variable is instrumented. It is straightforward to show that these estimates are
38 Standard errors are clustered at the province (11) and interview year (2004-2007) level (i.e. 44 clusters),
corresponding to the variation of the instrument.
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consistent with a situation where more risk averse individuals consume less and also earn
less (as they are less entrepreneurial), and income is negatively correlated with illegal status.39
To summarize, unconditional on income, IV estimates suggest that undocumented
immigrants consume about 40%-42% less than documented immigrants. Part of this reduction
in consumption is due to illegal immigrants having lower incomes than legal immigrants.
Conditioning on income, and instrumenting both income and legal status, results in an
estimated 29% lower consumption of illegal immigrants.
4.2.3 Consumption categories
Our data allow us to disaggregate total consumption into three categories: expenditure for
food and clothes; housing expenditure; and other expenditure, such as transportation and
leisure (see Section 3). To gain further insight into immigrants’ consumption choices, we now
use this information to estimate the effect of illegal status on consumption in each of these
categories. Results are reported in Table 8, where columns 1-3 refer to food and clothes,
columns 4-6 to housing, and columns 7-9 to other consumption. We report estimates
conditioning on individual and household controls.
Panel A reports OLS results where the dependent variable is the (log of) monthly
consumption for each category. As in previous tables, IV estimates in Panel B of Table 8 refer
to different sets of instrumental variables. Overall, IV coefficients are larger in size than OLS
coefficients and precisely estimated, showing that undocumented immigrants reduce each
type of consumption. However, there is substantial variation across categories. While
estimates suggest a 25% lower expenditure for food and clothing and for “other” consumption
39 We have also constructed a measure of predicted provincial wages as an alternative instrument for income.
Results (available upon request) are very similar to those reported where we use local unemployment as an
instrument.
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goods (which is the residual category), the largest reduction is for housing expenditure (minus
55%).
The large reduction in housing consumption is interesting, and may have several
explanations. First, given the low income of illegal immigrants, which places them below the
poverty line in Italy, housing may be the main margin where adjustments can be made.40 As
illustrated in online-Appendix Table A.10, a larger share of undocumented immigrants tends
to use free accommodation such as homeless shelter (11% versus 5%), sleeps in
accommodation provided by the employer (15.3% versus 5.9%), and shares accommodation
with immigrants who are not relatives. Only a small proportion (1.3%) of undocumented
immigrants reports living in an owned property compared to 14.9% of documented immigrants.
The large difference in housing expenditure between documented and undocumented
immigrants may also reflect constraints on housing consumption, as undocumented
immigrants cannot sign a legal rental contract, obtain a mortgage or purchase a flat. Obtaining
legal residence status would therefore correspond to relaxing these constraints, resulting in
an increase in the estimated parameters.
4.2.4 Does consumption respond to increased uncertainty?
One interpretation of the findings presented in the previous sections is that documented and
undocumented immigrants adjust their consumption behavior to the exposure to different
degrees of income risk, meaning that the difference in consumption may be partly due to
differences in precautionary savings. To investigate this further, and to provide additional
evidence that precautionary motives are at least one channel for the reduction in consumption
of illegal immigrants, we now use a different identification strategy, based on varying
40 Over the period considered (2004-2007), the absolute poverty line for an individual residing in urban areas
in the north of Italy was about 710 euros, while the relative poverty line was 570 euros. The average undocumented
immigrant in our sample falls below both thresholds, while the average documented immigrant is just above the
relative poverty line.
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uncertainty within the group of illegal immigrants. In particular, we use variation in deportation
risk across municipalities and over time and investigate whether consumption behavior of
illegal (but not of legal) immigrants responds to these changes.
That deportation risks are well recognized by immigrants is illustrated by Amuedo-
Dorantes et al. (2013) who show in the U.S. context that about 50% of a sample of
undocumented returnees to Mexico feared being deported while residing in the U.S., and that
such fears were higher when immigrants lived in states that enacted more punitive measures
against illegal residents. In Italy, the enforcement intensity in each Italian province is decided
at the local level where instructions from the central government are balanced with local
necessities and priorities (see Fasani 2010b). Hence, the number of undocumented
immigrants deported each year varies not only across, but also within provinces.41 Given the
unsystematic way in which these changes are imposed, it is unlikely that undocumented
immigrants can predict future levels of enforcement across areas to adjust their province of
residence ex ante. Deportation risk, however, become observable once stricter controls are
imposed. Immigrants can react by moving to another province, which however is costly as it
means leaving job/accommodation/contacts they have in the province of residence. While the
most risk averse migrants may move away, others will stay and adjust their consumption
accordingly. Hence, if there was self-selection into provinces according to deportation risk, we
would expect the more risk averse to move to areas with lower risks of deportation. This would
mean that the estimates we report below can be interpreted as a lower bound. It is important
41 Between 2004 and 2006, in the Lombardy region, the average probability of deportation in each year was
about 2.6% (with a standard deviation of 1.68 and a within-province standard deviation of 1.15), with a minimum
value of 0.04% and a maximum value of 6.76% (see Table 9). Further, over the period considered here, the
probability of undocumented immigrants being arrested and being detained for up to 60 days is about 5 times larger
than the probability of actually being deported.
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to note that, although changes in deportation risk are temporary, they can produce long-lasting
effects on future income, as a deportation leads to a substantial decrease in lifetime income.42
To make progress, we construct for each province of immigrant residence a measure of
deportation risk for the 2004–2006 period.43 We then run the same regressions on
consumption as in the previous sections but include the probability of deportation in the
province of residence as an additional control variable, together with time and province fixed
effects and other background characteristics. Therefore, our Diff-in-Diff design uses only the
within-province variation in deportation probabilities for identification.44
We report our estimates for illegal immigrants in columns 1–4 of Table 9, while columns
5–8 report those for legal immigrants, who should be unresponsive to these variations. For
both groups, we first control only for time and province fixed effects, and then add additional
individual and household controls. Estimates show that an increase in deportation risk within
provinces is significantly associated with lower consumption for undocumented immigrants,
with a one (within province) standard deviation increase in the probability of deportation (about
44% with respect to the mean) implying a 13% reduction in consumption (columns 1-4). In
contrast, and consistent with our hypothesis, we find no significant effects of deportation
42 In addition to financial losses, migrants deported from a country of the Schengen area - which includes all
EU countries except Great Britain and Ireland plus Iceland, Liechtenstein, Norway, and Switzerland – are banned
from legal access to any Schengen country for a minimum of five and a maximum of ten years.
43 The Lombardy region is divided into 11 administrative provinces, and the Italian Ministry of Interior reports
the number of undocumented immigrants removed every year from each province (see Fasani 2010b for details).
Based on the ISMU survey, we compute the stock of undocumented migrants residing in each county in each year.
The ratio of these two measures provides a proxy for the annual probability of being deported. Italian provinces do
not simply represent administrative entities, but also functional local labor markets. For instance, the highest level
of geographical disaggregation of Labor Force Survey statistics provided by the Italian National Institute of Statistics
(ISTAT) is at the provincial level (NUT3).
44 We use the same estimating sample as the one of our main specification, but we omit observations for 2007
because deportation risk measures are missing for that year.
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probabilities on consumption for legal immigrants (columns 5–8), with point estimates being
close to zero. Moreover, estimated coefficients on the deportation probabilities hardly change
when additional controls are included, which indicates that deportation risk is uncorrelated with
immigrant characteristics, pointing at there being no selection into provinces based on
deportation risk.
These findings speak in favor of income risk being an important determinant of illegal
immigrants’ consumption behavior, and support the hypothesis that precautionary motives are
an important reason for illegal immigrants consuming less than legal immigrants.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
This paper is – to the best of our knowledge - the first analysis of consumption behavior of
immigrants. Drawing on unique data for a country that experienced large scale immigration
over the past decades, much of it undocumented, we illustrate stark differences in
consumption pattern between documented and undocumented immigrants. Using two novel
instrumental variable strategies to address the sorting of immigrants into legal status, we
speak to an important issue in the policy debate on illegal immigration – the effect of
legalization programs on immigrants’ consumption behavior.
Our results imply that legalization programs may lead to an increased level of immigrant
consumption in the host country, with potentially beneficial effects for both the host country’s
economy and the immigrants’ degree of socioeconomic integration. Indeed, our estimates
could be cautiously used to provide back-of-the-envelope calculations of how an amnesty that
regularizes all undocumented immigrants could increase consumption in Italy. To do so, we
would need to assume that our estimated coefficient is an average treatment effect and that a
generalized amnesty would not produce general equilibrium effects that could affect that
coefficient. In that case, after amnesty, the regularized immigrants would raise their monthly
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per capita expenditure by about 230 euros,45 meaning that, based on the latest estimate of
the number of undocumented immigrants (560,000 in 2010; see Fasani et al. 2013), a
legalization of all immigrants in Italy would translate into a total increase in consumption of
about 1.5 billion euros, or about 0.1% of the 2010 Italian GDP.
If we assume that our estimates also apply to the U.S., the per capita increase in monthly
consumption after regularization would be around 430 U.S. dollars, based on the 2012
Consumption Expenditure Survey (CEX) data on the expenditures of individuals of Latino or
Hispanic origin.46 Given an estimate of 11.5 million undocumented immigrants, an amnesty
regularizing the legal status of all those immigrants would imply a higher level of expenditures
in the U.S. of about 60 billion U.S. dollars; that is, approximately 0.4% of the nation’s 2012
GDP. These calculations suggest that – again, with the caveat that we ignore general
equilibrium effects - the expected increase in expenditures after regularization may be
substantial, with clear distributional consequences in favor of the host countries.
Our findings are also important for analysis on the effects of immigration on the host
economy more generally. Borjas (2013) highlights the importance of understanding the
balance between the impact of immigration on the size of the consumer base for assessment
of permanent wage effects. Our analysis suggests that undocumented immigrants lead to a
lower expansion of consumption than legal immigrants, which may have important implications
for how they impact on the labor market, wages, employment, as well as tax revenue.
45 We compute per capita expenditures using the information on average monthly consumption and average
household size of documented immigrants in Table 1 and Table 2.
46 To compute the per capita increase in monthly consumption, we use information from the 2012 CEX on
average annual expenditure (42268 U.S. dollars) and size (3.3) of Hispanic or Latino origin households. We
compute an average monthly individual expenditure of about 1070 U.S. dollars and assume this is the level of
consumption of documented immigrants in the U.S. Note that if the uncertainty associated with illegal status is
lower in the U.S. than in Italy (see Section 3) we would expect a smaller effect in the U.S. context.
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Tables
TABLE 1—DOCUMENTED AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS
Note. * denotes a difference between documented and undocumented immigrants that is significant at least at 5% level. Sample:
immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU survey years: 2004–2007.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Respondent: Age 33.32 7.64 31.60 8.50 *
Female 0.42 0.49 0.37 0.48 *
Education: none 0.09 0.28 0.11 0.31 *
primary/compulsory 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.48
secondary 0.40 0.49 0.42 0.49
tertiary 0.14 0.35 0.12 0.33 *
Residence in Italy (years) 5.81 2.44 2.68 1.78 *
Unemployed 0.04 0.20 0.08 0.27 *
Single 0.33 0.47 0.55 0.50 *
Children (dummy) 0.58 0.49 0.45 0.50 *
Household: # household members in Italy 2.43 1.47 1.45 0.95 *
spouse abroad (if married) 0.25 0.44 0.59 0.49 *
children abroad (if children>0) 0.38 0.49 0.84 0.37 *
# children abroad (if any) 1.82 0.98 1.92 1.02 *
children in Italy (if children>0) 0.68 0.47 0.23 0.42 *
# children in Italy (if any) 1.76 0.89 1.40 0.64 *
living in own house in Italy 0.15 0.36 0.01 0.11 *
Area of origin: Subsaharan Africa 0.17 0.38 0.16 0.36
East Asia (and Pacific) 0.06 0.23 0.03 0.18 *
Eastern Europe & Central Asia 0.27 0.44 0.36 0.48 *
Latin America 0.15 0.35 0.19 0.39 *
Middle East & North Africa 0.23 0.42 0.20 0.40 *
South Asia 0.12 0.33 0.06 0.24 *
significant
difference
(5%)
0.13
Total observations
Undocumented immigrants share
11865 1807
Documented
immigrants
Undocumented
immigrantsVariable
Observations
13672
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TABLE 2—DOCUMENTED AND UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS: CONSUMPTION AND INCOME
Note. * denotes a difference between documented and undocumented immigrants that is significant at least at 5% level. Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU survey years:
2004–2007.
Mean Std. Dev. Mean Std. Dev.
Consumption: Total 581.6 267.2 424.6 243.8 *
Food & Clothes 220.0 116.9 177.5 113.1 *
Housing 244.4 156.3 151.5 137.1 *
Other 117.3 95.5 95.6 82.5 *
Total Income 815.5 376.9 710.4 339.2 *
Consumption: Total 0.74 0.22 0.65 0.27 *
Food & Clothes 0.39 0.14 0.44 0.20 *
Housing 0.40 0.17 0.31 0.21 *
Other 0.21 0.13 0.25 0.21 *
Observations
significant
difference
(5%)
Share of total income
Share of total consumption
11,865 1,807
Documented
immigrants
Undocumented
immigrants
 Monthly values (euros)
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TABLE 3 – ILLEGAL RESIDENCE STATUS AND RAINFALL SHOCKS: FIRST STAGE REGRESSIONS
Note. This table reports LPM estimates of the “Illegal residence status” dummy (columns 1-8) and of individual characteristics (log age, gender, education; columns 9-11) on rainfall and other controls.
The dummy Illegal residence status equals one if the respondent lacks legal status (alternative definitions of illegal residence status are used in columns 7 and 8). The variables ln (Rainfall) are the
logarithm of rainfall in the country of origin (normalized by the average within-country standard deviation) in the year of emigration (T), one year before emigration (T-1), two years before emigration
(T-2), and averaged over the year of migration and the year before (T, T-1). The variable ln (Current Rainfall) is the logarithm of rainfall in the country of origin (normalized by the average within-
country standard deviation) in the year of the interview. Baseline controls include: origin country dummies, year dummies (2004-2007) and number of years of residence in Italy of the respondent.
Individual controls include: gender, age, age squared, dummies for education level (none, primary, secondary, tertiary) and dummies for Italian province of residence. HH controls include: number of
members in the household living in Italy, a dummy for spouse living abroad, number of children living in Italy and abroad, dummy for home ownership. ln (income) is log monthly income. For each
column, the table reports the F-statistic (IV: F-stat) and the p-value (IV: p-value F-stat) from a joint significance test of the excluded instrument(s). Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence
in Italy. ISMU survey years: 2004–2007. Standard errors: robust and clustered by country of origin (103 clusters); *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Illegal2 Illegal3 ln (Age) Female
Higher
Education
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
ln (Rainfall (T)) 0.032*** 0.030*** 0.031***
[0.005] [0.005] [0.005]
ln (Rainfall (T-1)) 0.018*** 0.017***
[0.005] [0.005]
ln (Rainfall (T-2)) 0.006
[0.004]
ln (Rainfall (T,T-1)) 0.046*** 0.046*** 0.045*** 0.049*** 0.039*** 0.002 -0.004 0.007
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.003] [0.005] [0.006]
ln (Current Rainfall) -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.002 0.005
[0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.006] [0.008]
Baseline controls X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X
HH controls X X
ln(income) X
Observations 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672
R-squared 0.211 0.214 0.214 0.234 0.240 0.254 0.237 0.205 0.133 0.182 0.078
IV: F-stat 34.46 20.93 15.18 40.15 39.49 35.55 38.51 29.32 0.31 0.45 1.40
IV: p-value F-stat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.58 0.50 0.24
Demographics characteristics
Illegal
Alternative definitions of Illegal residence status
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TABLE 4 - ILLEGAL RESIDENCE STATUS AND QUOTAS: FIRST STAGE REGRESSIONS
Note. This table reports LPM estimates of the “Illegal residence status” dummy on the quota system instruments. The dummy Illegal residence status equals one if the respondent lacks legal status.
In Panel A, we use our main quota instrument, ln (Total Quotas), i.e. the residuals of log of total quotas since arrival in Italy after estimating equation (2) (see Section 2.3). In panel B, we use two
alternative quota instruments. First, we use the instrument ln (Total Quotas) - “adaptive” expect. (as defined in Section 2.3) and we then jointly use the residuals of the total number of residence
permits offered through the quota system to citizens of Albania, Morocco and Tunisia (ln (Country-Reserved Quotas)) and of the total number of residence permits offered to immigrants of all other
nationalities (ln (non-Country-Reserved Quotas)). Baseline, individual and HH controls and ln (income) are defined as in the note to Table 3. For each regression, the table reports the F-statistic (IV:
F-stat) and the p-value (IV: p-value F-stat) from a joint significance test of the excluded instrument(s). Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU survey years: 2004–2007.
Standard errors: robust and clustered by years since arrival in Italy and year of interview (40 clusters); *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
1 2 3 4
ln (Total Quotas) -0.309*** -0.301*** -0.306*** -0.294***
[0.039] [0.039] [0.039] [0.038]
IV: F-stat 61.32 59.72 61.69 58.59
IV: p-value F-stat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
ln (Total Quotas) - "adaptive" expect. -0.118*** -0.114*** -0.116*** -0.111***
[0.042] [0.041] [0.041] [0.039]
IV: F-stat 7.876 7.543 7.754 8.012
IV: p-value F-stat 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.01
ln (Country-Reserved Quotas) -0.324*** -0.314*** -0.318*** -0.308***
[0.049] [0.048] [0.048] [0.047]
ln (Non Country-Reserved Quotas) -0.149*** -0.146*** -0.149*** -0.140***
[0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
IV: F-stat 49.60 48.07 50.67 46.68
IV: p-value F-stat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baseline controls X X X X
Individual controls X X X
HH controls X X
ln (income) X
Observations 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672
Panel B: alternative quota IVs
Panel A: main quota IV
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TABLE 5— MONTHLY CONSUMPTION: OLS AND IV ESTIMATES
Note. This table reports OLS (columns 1-2) and IV estimates (columns 3-12) of log monthly consumption on illegal residence status and other controls. The dummy Illegal residence status equals one
if the respondent lacks legal status. In columns 3-12 we treat the variable Illegal residence status as endogenous and instrument it with alternative sets of instrumental variables: a) ln (Rainfall (T, T-
1)) (columns 3-4); b) ln (Total Quotas) (columns 5-6); c) ln (Rainfall (T, T-1)) and ln (Total Quotas) (columns 7-8); d) ln (Total Quotas)- “adaptive” expect. (columns 9-10); e) ln (Country-Reserved
Quotas) and ln (non-Country-Reserved Quotas) (columns 11-12). Odd columns condition on baseline and individual controls, while even columns condition also on household controls. Baseline,
individual and HH controls are defined as in the note to Table 3. For each column, the table reports the F-statistic (IV: F-stat) and the p-value (IV: p-value F-stat) from a joint significance test of the
excluded instrument(s) and the p-value from a regression-based version of the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test for endogeneity (Durbin-Wu-Hausman test: p-value). When illegal residence status is
instrumented with more than one instrument (columns 7-8 and 11-12) the p-value from the Hansen overidentification test is reported. Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU
survey years: 2004–2007. Standard errors: robust and clustered by country of origin (103 clusters); *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12
Illegal residence status -0.303*** -0.287*** -0.578*** -0.571*** -0.510*** -0.533*** -0.519*** -0.537*** -0.557*** -0.591*** -0.523*** -0.542***
[0.026] [0.025] [0.200] [0.185] [0.060] [0.058] [0.067] [0.064] [0.106] [0.100] [0.067] [0.064]
Baseline controls X X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X X X X X X X
HH controls X X X X X X
Observations 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672
IV: F-stat - - 39.12 38.52 59.72 61.69 54.33 55.71 7.543 7.754 48.07 50.67
IV: p-value F-stat - - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.00
Durbin-Wu-Hausman test: p-value - - 0.13 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Hansen overidentification test: p-value - - - - - - 0.71 0.82 - - 0.44 0.54
Alternative quota IVs
IV estimates
ln (Total Quotas) -
"adaptive" expect.
ln (Country-
Reserved Quotas) -
and ln (Non Country-
Reserved Quotas)
OLS estimates ln (Rainfall (T,T-1)) ln (Total Quotas)
ln (Rainfall (T,T-1))
and ln (Total
Quotas)
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TABLE 6 - MONTHLY CONSUMPTION - ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: OLS AND IV ESTIMATES
Note. This table reports OLS (Panel A) and IV estimates (Panel B) of log monthly consumption on illegal residence status and other controls. The dummy Illegal residence status equals one if the
respondent lacks legal status. Each row in Panel B reports IV estimates obtained using a different instrument (set of instruments): a) ln (Rainfall (T, T-1)); b) ln (Total Quotas); c) ln (Rainfall (T, T-1))
and ln (Total Quotas). We perform the following robustness checks: a) we use three alternative definitions of individual consumption, as defined in Section 3.1 (columns 1-3); b) we use two alternative
definitions of illegal status, as defined in online-Appendix Table A.2 (columns 4-5); c) we drop from the main sample all respondents who report to be living in their own house (columns 6); d) we
restrict the estimating sample to households with only one member (column 7). Baseline and individual controls are defined as in the note to Table 3. Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence
in Italy. ISMU survey years: 2004–2007. Standard errors: robust and clustered by country of origin (103 clusters); *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
"Modified"
OECD
equivalence
scale
OECD
equivalence
scale
Unweighted
normalization
Illegal2 Illegal3
Excluding
home owners
Only one-
member HHs
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Illegal residence status -0.303*** -0.262*** -0.203*** -0.316*** -0.238*** -0.285*** -0.275***
[0.026] [0.027] [0.029] [0.027] [0.025] [0.027] [0.025]
Illegal residence status -0.578*** -0.633*** -0.712*** -0.546*** -0.680*** -0.571*** -0.534***
[0.200] [0.201] [0.208] [0.193] [0.240] [0.180] [0.131]
Illegal residence status -0.510*** -0.531*** -0.570*** -0.511*** -0.568*** -0.505*** -0.543***
[0.060] [0.062] [0.073] [0.065] [0.065] [0.065] [0.084]
Illegal residence status -0.519*** -0.544*** -0.587*** -0.516*** -0.580*** -0.514*** -0.541***
[0.067] [0.068] [0.076] [0.072] [0.072] [0.068] [0.077]
Baseline controls X X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X X
Observations 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 11,879 6,069
IV: ln (Rainfall (T,T-1)) and ln (Total Quotas)
Alternative measures of consumption
IV: ln (Rainfall (T,T-1))
IV: ln (Total Quotas)
Alternative definitions of Illegal
residence status
Panel A: OLS estimates
Panel B: IV estimates
Subsamples
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TABLE 7 - MONTHLY CONSUMPTION - CONDITIONING ON INCOME: OLS AND IV ESTIMATES
Note. This table reports OLS (columns 1) and IV estimates (columns 2-7) of log monthly consumption on illegal residence status, log monthly income and other controls. The dummy Illegal residence
status equals one if the respondent lacks legal status. In columns 2-7, we treat the variable Illegal residence status as endogenous and instrument it with: a) ln (Rainfall (T, T-1)) (columns 2-3); b) ln
(Total Quotas) (columns 4-5); c) ln (Rainfall (T, T-1)) and ln (Total Quotas) (columns 6-7). In columns 3, 5 and 7 we instrument ln (income) with the unemployment rate in the province of residence.
All controls include baseline, individual and HH controls as defined in the note to Table 3. Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU survey years: 2004–2007. Standard errors:
robust and clustered by country of origin (103 clusters); *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
OLS
1 2 3 4 5 6 7
Illegal residence status -0.132*** -0.296** -0.394** -0.182* -0.323** -0.196** -0.338***
[0.025] [0.132] [0.161] [0.107] [0.141] [0.097] [0.128]
ln (income) 0.773*** 0.757*** 0.487*** 0.768*** 0.458** 0.766*** 0.446**
[0.014] [0.016] [0.177] [0.016] [0.179] [0.016] [0.182]
Illegal residence status - X X X X X X
ln (income) - - X - X - X
All controls X X X X X X X
Observations 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672
IV estimates
Variables instrumented:
ln (Rainfall (T,T-1)) ln (Total Quotas)
ln (Rainfall (T,T-1))
and ln (Total Quotas)
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TABLE 8 - MONTHLY CONSUMPTION - CONSUMPTION CATEGORIES: OLS AND IV ESTIMATES
Note. This table reports OLS (Panel A) and IV estimates (Panel B) of log monthly expenditure for three different categories of consumption (food and clothes, columns 1-3; housing, columns 4-6;
other, column 7-9) on illegal residence status and other controls. The dummy Illegal residence status equals one if the respondent lacks legal status. Each row in Panel B reports IV estimates obtained
using a different instrument (set of instruments): a) ln (Rainfall (T, T-1)); b) ln (Total Quotas); c) ln (Rainfall (T, T-1)) and ln (Total Quotas). All these instruments are defined as in the notes to Table 3
and Table 4. Baseline, individual and HH controls and ln (income) are defined as in the note to Table 3. Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU survey years: 2004–2007.
Standard errors: robust and clustered by country of origin (103 clusters); *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Illegal residence status -0.292*** -0.274*** -0.130** -0.821*** -0.748*** -0.471*** -0.308*** -0.314*** -0.126***
[0.049] [0.044] [0.053] [0.085] [0.079] [0.072] [0.045] [0.044] [0.036]
Illegal residence status -0.721*** -0.718*** -0.470** -1.610*** -1.660*** -1.183*** -0.612 -0.567 -0.228
[0.239] [0.233] [0.191] [0.507] [0.467] [0.450] [0.387] [0.380] [0.282]
Illegal residence status -0.554*** -0.573*** -0.252** -1.227*** -1.375*** -0.756*** -0.777*** -0.736*** -0.313***
[0.098] [0.099] [0.124] [0.333] [0.315] [0.291] [0.150] [0.145] [0.119]
-0.574*** -0.590*** -0.278** -1.273*** -1.409*** -0.808*** -0.757*** -0.715*** -0.303***
[0.098] [0.100] [0.117] [0.318] [0.302] [0.272] [0.149] [0.144] [0.110]
Baseline controls X X X X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X X X X
HH controls X X X X X X
ln (income) X X X
Observations 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672
IV: ln (Rainfall (T,T-1))
IV: ln (Total Quotas)
IV: ln (Rainfall (T,T-1)) and ln (Total Quotas)
Food & Clothes Housing Other
Panel B: IV estimates
Panel A: OLS estimates
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TABLE 9—PROBABILITY OF DEPORTATION AND CONSUMPTION
Note. This table reports OLS regression estimates of log of monthly consumption on the probability of deportation in the province of residence and other controls. Province and year dummies include:
dummies for Italian province of residence and year dummies (2004-2006). Individual controls include: gender, age, age squared, dummies for education level (none, primary, secondary, tertiary),
origin country dummies, number of years of residence in Italy of the respondent. HH controls include: number of members in the household living in Italy, a dummy for spouse living abroad, number
of children living in Italy and abroad, dummy for home ownership. Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU survey years: 2004–2006. Standard errors (in brackets): robust
and clustered by Italian province of residence (11 provinces) and year of the interview (3 years); *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
Prob. of deportation -0.157*** -0.115*** -0.117*** -0.116*** -0.012 -0.012 -0.012 -0.010
[0.036] [0.041] [0.039] [0.032] [0.015] [0.014] [0.014] [0.006]
Province and year dummies X X X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X
HH controls X X X X
ln (income) X X
Observations 1,299 1,299 1,299 1,299 8,413 8,413 8,413 8,413
R-squared 0.100 0.317 0.325 0.569 0.141 0.169 0.190 0.588
Probability of deportation (%)
Mean Std Dev
Within
Std Dev
2.59 1.68 1.15
Min-Max
0.04 - 6.76
Undocumented immigrants Documented immigrants
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A. Appendix - For Online Publication
A1.The ISMU data
The ISMU data are sampled using an intercept point survey methodology based on the
tendency of immigrants to cluster at certain locations (McKenzie and Mistiaen, 2009;
Blangiardo, 2008). The first step is to create a list of popular intercept points (e.g., ethnic shops
and gatherings, churches, health care facilities) and then to randomly select the meeting points
and the migrants who visit them for interview. At each location, interviewees are asked how
often they visit any of the other meeting points, which allows ex-post selection probabilities to
be computed and added to the sample. The Italian government officially recognized the
reliability of this technique in 2005, when it commissioned and financed survey implementation
at the national level, with over 30 thousand immigrants interviewed. See Strozza (2004) for a
survey of the different methodologies used to estimate undocumented migrants in the Italian
context and Boeri et al. (2015) for a comparison of data sources. Mastrobuoni and Pinotti
(2011) and Accetturo and Infante (2010) also use ISMU data.
The ISMU survey provides a representative sample of legal and illegal migrants residing
in the Lombardy region, one of Italy’s largest (8% of the Italian territory), most populated (9.6
million of inhabitants in 2008, about 16% of the Italian population), and wealthiest regions.
This area accounts for almost 20% of the national GDP, with a GDP per capita of about 33
thousand euros in 2008 relative to a national average of 25 thousand. It also has the largest
migrant population of both documented (23% of the entire migrant population legally residing
in Italy in 2005) and undocumented migrants (22% of the amnesty applications in the last
regularization process in 2002).
The interview questionnaire contains a variety of questions on individual characteristics
(e.g., demographics, educational level, labor market outcomes, legal status) and household
characteristics (e.g., number of household members in Italy, family members abroad,
housing). Since 2004, it also includes questions about household expenditure, savings and
remittances. Most particularly, each interviewee is asked to report average monthly
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expenditures of their household in Italy for each of the following broad categories: (a) food,
clothing, and other basic needs; (b) housing; (c) other items (e.g., transportation, leisure, etc.).
Our measure for consumption in the host country is the sum of these three types of
expenditure. Immigrants are also asked about the household’s average monthly expenditure
for remittances and average monthly savings. Our measure for total household income is
computed as the sum of these five items.
A2.Identification issues
We now discuss the potential bias in our estimates when using OLS, and how it is addressed
by our identification strategies. The underlying (main) mechanism that could lead to biased
estimates in OLS regressions is that the two groups of immigrants have different risk attitudes
on average. Illegal status implies higher exposure to uncertainty (see our discussion in Section
3), so that sorting leads individuals choosing this option having an average lower risk aversion
than individuals who are legally resident in the host country.
In this case, and as risk aversion is not observable, we can rewrite the error term in the
consumption equation (1) as ௜߳௧ = ߱ݎ௜+ ݑ௜௧, where ݎ௜ is the individual-specific degree of risk
aversion and ݑ௜௧ is an error term uncorrelated with legal status. If more risk averse individuals
consume less at any given level of uncertainty and if undocumented immigrants consume less
because of exposure to higher uncertainty, the coefficients ߱ and ߚ in equation (1) are both
negative. As more risk averse individuals are less likely to be undocumented, ܥ݋ݒ(ܫ௜,ݎ௜) < 0.
We now derive the OLS bias and discuss potential biases in the IV estimates (Section A2.1).
For simplicity, we omit the year subscript t from the notation.
A2.1 OLS bias and Instrument Validity
For simplicity we ignore the vector of controls ܺ௜and consider the regression (where we omit
the time index): ܥ௜= ߚܫ௜+ ௜݁.
Assuming ܥ݋ݒ(ܫ௜,ݑ௜) = 0, we obtain
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݌݈ ݅݉ ߚை௅ௌ = ߚ+ ఠ஼௢௩(ூ,௥)௏௔௥(ூ) (A1)
Since ߱<0 and ܥ݋ݒ(ܫ௜,ݎ௜) < 0, the OLS coefficient will be biased upward. If illegal status
affects consumption negatively, |ߚ| ≥ |ߚை௅ௌ|.
Rainfall Shocks: Using rainfall shocks ܵ in the country of origin at the time of migration
as an instrument for legal status is based on the assumption that these shocks relax credit
constraints and induce more potential migrants in the home country to opt for an illegal
migration, which implies that ݒ(ܫ, )ܵ > 0. As we discuss in Section 2.2, international migration
decisions are based on permanent differences in lifetime income. Therefore, temporary rainfall
shocks should leave the total pool of potential migrants unaltered, as long as they are
uncorrelated over time, which we show to be the case in our data.47 As a consequence, the
composition of the immigrant population in Italy with respect to observables that are typically
correlated with risk aversion should not be correlated with rainfall shocks at emigration, which
we demonstrate to be the case in Section 4.1 and Table 3. Thus, if the average risk aversion
of the migrant population does not change in response to rainfall shocks (ܥ݋ݒ( ,ܵݎ) = 0), our
IV estimator consistently estimates the parameter ߚ, and |ߚଶௌ௅ௌ| ≥ |ߚை௅ௌ|.
We now explore the potential bias of the IV estimator in case that weather shocks
change the pool of immigrants towards lower risk aversion. This would imply a negative
correlation between rainfall and average risk aversion (ܥ݋ݒ( ,ܵݎ) < 0). Define ܫመ௜ as the
47 To test for persistence, we first compute rainfall shocks as deviations of yearly rainfalls from their historical
mean. We then average rainfall shocks by geographic area using the World Bank classification. This computation
produces six time series consisting of yearly observations each, for the years 1994 to 2007 (i.e. the time period
between the year of arrival of the first migrants in our estimation sample and the year of the last wave of the survey).
We then estimate fifth-order autocorrelations (AC), partial autocorrelations (PAC), and portmanteau (Q) statistics
that test for white noise based on a null hypothesis of no autocorrelation up to a certain lag. Both the
autocorrelations and the portmanteau statistics suggest that rainfall shocks show no persistence, except for South
Asia (these tests are available upon request). Our estimates of the consumption equation are robust to the
exclusion of migrants from South Asia.
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predicted values of illegal status obtained by running the first stage regression of illegal status
ܫ௜on ௜ܵ. The ݌݈ ݅݉ of the parameter ߚ in the second stage regression ܥ௜= ߚܫ௜+ ௜݁ is then given
by:
݌݈ ݅݉ ߚଶௌ௅ௌ = ߚ+ ஼௢௩(ூመ,ఌ)௏௔௥(ூመ) = ߚ+ ஼௢௩(ఈௌ,ఠ௥)௏௔௥(ఈௌ) = ߚ+ ఠ஼௢௩(ௌ,௥)ఈ௏௔௥(ௌ) (A2)
Since ߱ < 0, ܥ݋ݒ( ,ܵݎ) < 0 and ߙ = ஼௢௩(ூ೔,ௌ೔)
௏௔௥(ௌ೔) > 0, the IV coefficient will be upward biased, so
that |ߚ| ≥ |ߚଶௌ௅ௌ|. In this case, therefore, the IV estimates will identify a lower bound (in
absolute value) of the effect of being undocumented on immigrant consumption, and both OLS
and IV would tend to underestimate (in absolute value) the causal effect of illegal status on
consumption.
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Online Appendix Figures
FIGURE A.1 – TOTAL CUMULATIVE QUOTAS (IN LOGS) AND YEAR OF ARRIVAL IN ITALY, BY SURVEY WAVE
FIGURE A.2 – RESIDUALS OF TOTAL CUMULATIVE QUOTAS (IN LOGS) AND YEAR OF ARRIVAL IN ITALY, BY SURVEY WAVE
Note. Predicted residuals are obtained from regressing the log of total cumulative quotas on years since migration and four ISMU
wave dummies.
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Online Appendix Tables
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TABLE A.1 - COUNTRIES OF ORIGIN, UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS SHARES AND AGRICULTURAL SECTOR
Note. This table reports the nationality composition of our sample. For each country of origin, we report the number of
observations, the share in our estimating sample, and the share of undocumented migrants (columns 1-3). In columns 4-5, we
report World Bank data on shares of agricultural employment and GDP. In the last three rows, we report these shares for the
first 20 countries in our sample (the average across countries weighted by the number of observations from each country), for
Italy, and the average for all OECD countries.
Observations
Share of total
sample
Share of
undocumented
immigrants
Employment
share
GDP share
MOROCCO 1576 0.12 0.10 44.88 15.83
ALBANIA 1346 0.10 0.09 66.17 30.66
ROMANIA 874 0.06 0.22 38.18 15.52
SENEGAL 761 0.06 0.20 - 18.76
EGYPT 682 0.05 0.20 30.06 16.54
ECUADOR 615 0.04 0.16 7.81 11.12
PERU 593 0.04 0.18 4.05 8.30
UKRAINE 579 0.04 0.29 21.47 14.12
PAKISTAN 547 0.04 0.10 45.40 24.99
INDIA 526 0.04 0.04 66.70 23.94
TUNISIA 477 0.03 0.08 - 12.24
CHINA 447 0.03 0.08 46.64 15.60
MOLDOVA 327 0.02 0.33 46.36 26.66
COTE D'IVOIRE 307 0.02 0.05 - 23.45
PHILIPPINES 238 0.02 0.09 38.85 16.84
SRI LANKA 235 0.02 0.08 34.74 20.29
BRAZIL 222 0.02 0.15 22.80 5.98
NIGERIA 219 0.02 0.15 - 29.63
BANGLADESH 209 0.02 0.08 59.00 24.07
GHANA 203 0.01 0.08 55.00 36.63
Other 79 nationalities 2689 0.20 0.09 - -
Total 13672 1.00 0.13
40.7 19.1
5.5 2.8
4.2 1.9OECD countries
Country
Sample Agriculture sector (1995-2007)
Sample weighted avg (first 20 countries)
Italy
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TABLE A.2 — ALTERNATIVE DEFINITIONS OF UNDOCUMENTED IMMIGRANTS
Note. Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU survey years: 2004–2007.
TABLE A.3 - QUOTAS (1996-2007)
Note. This table reports the size of yearly quotas (total, non-national-reserved and national-reserved) set by the Italian government in the period 1996 to 2007.
obs. % Illegal Illegal2 Illegal3
Italian citizenship 320 2.34
Permanent residence permit 2,022 14.79
Temporary residence permit 8,852 64.75
No residence permit 1,697 12.41 X X X
Applicant for legalization 110 0.8 X X
Renewing temporary residence permit 671 4.91 X
Total observations 13672 100 1,807 1,697 2,478
Undocumented share 0.13 0.12 0.18
Undocumented immigrants
Current residence status
1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Total quotas 23,000 20,000 58,000 58,000 83,000 89,400 79,500 79,500 79,500 99,500 550,000 252,000
of which:
Total non national-reserved quotas 23,000 20,000 52,000 52,000 65,500 74,400 65,500 75,700 59,100 78,500 511,500 204,400
Total national-reserved quotas - - 6,000 6,000 17,500 15,000 14,000 3,800 20,400 21,000 38,500 47,600
of which:
Albania 3,000 3,000 6,000 6,000 3,000 1,000 3,000 3,000 4,500 4,500
Marocco 1,500 1,500 3,000 1,500 2,000 500 2,500 2,500 4,000 4,500
Tunisia 1,500 1,500 3,000 3,000 2,000 600 3,000 3,000 3,500 4,000
Other countries - - 5,500 4,500 7,000 1,700 11,900 12,500 26,500 34,600
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TABLE A.4 - ILLEGAL RESIDENCE STATUS: AGRICULTURE SECTOR, FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND LARGE COUNTRIES
Note. This table reports LPM estimates of the “Illegal residence status” dummy on rainfall and other controls. The dummy Illegal residence status equals one if the respondent lacks legal status. In
columns 2-5, Log Rainfall (T, T-1) is interacted with dummies that identify countries whose GDP (employment) share in agriculture is, respectively, above the 75th percentile or below the 25th
percentile of the distribution in the countries we have in our sample. In columns 6-7, Log Rainfall (T, T-1) is interacted with dummies that identify countries whose banking sector (as a share of GDP)
is, respectively, above the 75th percentile or below the 25th percentile of the distribution in the countries we have in our sample. In columns 3, 5 and 7, we control for the log of real GDP per capita
in the country of origin at the time of emigration (Log GDP per capita (T)). In columns 8-10, we exclude immigrants from, respectively, the first 10, 20 and 30 largest countries in our sample. The
countries of origin ranking according to their total land area is: 1) China; 2) Brazil; 3) India; 4) Argentina; 5) Kazakhstan; 6) Sudan; 7) Algeria; 8) Congo, the Democratic Republic; 9) Mexico; 10) Saudi
Arabia; 11) Indonesia; 12) Libya; 13) Iran; 14) Peru; 15) Chad; 16) Niger; 17) Angola; 18) Mali; 19) Colombia; 20) Ethiopia; 21) Bolivia; 22) Mauritania; 23) Egypt; 24) Tanzania; 25) Nigeria; 26)
Venezuela; 27) Namibia; 28) Pakistan; 29) Mozambique; 30) Turkey. Current Log Rainfall, Baseline controls and Individual controls are defined as in the note to Table 3. For each column, the table
reports the F-statistic (IV: F-stat) and the p-value (IV: p-value F-stat) from a joint significance test of the excluded instrument(s). Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU
survey years: 2004–2007. Standard errors: robust and clustered by country of origin (103 clusters); *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
First 10 First 20 First 30
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.046*** 0.044*** 0.041*** 0.044*** 0.040*** 0.053*** 0.049*** 0.047*** 0.048*** 0.044***
[0.007] [0.008] [0.008] [0.009] [0.009] [0.007] [0.008] [0.007] [0.008] [0.008]
Log Rainfall (T,T-1): * dummy (agriculture GDP share above 75th pct) 0.038*** 0.043***
[0.012] [0.010]
* dummy (agriculture GDP share below 25th pct) -0.016 -0.008
[0.020] [0.019]
* dummy (agriculture empl share above 75th pct) 0.040** 0.044***
[0.016] [0.016]
* dummy (agriculture empl share below 25th pct) -0.003 0.014
[0.045] [0.044]
* dummy (banking sector - above 75th pct) -0.012** -0.010**
[0.005] [0.005]
* dummy (banking sector - below 25th pct) 0.018 0.017
[0.011] [0.011]
-0.002 -0.002 -0.001 -0.005 -0.002 -0.003 -0.002 -0.002 -0.003 0.003
[0.006] [0.006] [0.006] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.006] [0.007] [0.005]
Baseline controls X X X X X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X X X X X
Log GDP per capita (T) X X X
Observations 13,672 13,613 13,602 11,251 11,249 13,459 13,454 12,120 11,290 9,534
R-squared 0.234 0.235 0.236 0.243 0.245 0.240 0.241 0.242 0.245 0.230
IV: F-stat 40.15 48.29 54.76 24.20 20.80 20.36 13.00 39.60 37.36 27.20
IV: p-value F-stat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Log Rainfall (T,T-1)
Current log rainfall
Large countries excluded:
Illegal residence status
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TABLE A.5 - RAINFALL, AGRICULTURAL OUTPUT AND INCOME IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Note. This table reports estimates of agricultural (column 1) and total income per capita (columns 2-4) on the log of yearly rainfall (columns 1-2) and on log of agricultural output (columns 3-4). In all
regressions, we condition on country dummies, year dummies and country-specific time trends. We report OLS estimates in columns 1-3 while in column 4 we report IV estimates obtained by
instrumenting log of agricultural output with log of rainfall (First Stage estimates and F-statistics are also reported in column 4). The variables are defined as follows: ln (Agricultural Income) is the log
of Gross Production Value for crops (constant 2004-2006 million US$); ln (Total Income) is the log of GDP per capita in constant 2005 USD; ln (Rainfall) is the log of yearly rainfalls; ln (Agricultural
Output) is the log of the gross per capita production index number (2004-2006 = 100; the FAO indices of agricultural production show the relative level of the aggregate volume of agricultural production
for each year in comparison with the base period 2004-2006: they are based on the sum of price-weighted quantities of different agricultural commodities produced after deductions of quantities used
as seed).
Sample: panel data for 97 developing countries (World Bank definition) over the period 1979-2012. Standard errors: robust and clustered by country; *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant
at 1%.
ln (Agricultural
Income)
OLS OLS OLS IV
1 2 3 4
ln (Rainfall) 0.191*** 0.035**
[0.036] [0.016]
ln (Agricultural Output) 0.255*** 0.243**
[0.055] [0.116]
First Stage regression - IV: ln (Rainfall) 0.129***
[0.025]
Country dummies X X X X
Year dummies X X X X
Country-specific time trends X X X X
Observations 2,472 2,995 2,927 2,927
IV: F-stat - - - 25.75
ln (Total Income)
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Table A.6 – RAINFALL AND ILLEGAL RESIDENCE STATUS – HETEROGENEITY ACROSS GEOGRAPHICAL AREAS
Note. This table reports LPM estimates of the “Illegal residence status” dummy on rainfall and other controls. The dummy Illegal residence status equals one if the respondent lacks legal status. The
variable ln Rainfall (T, T-1) is the logarithm of rainfall in the country of origin (normalized by the average within-country standard deviation) averaged over the year of migration and the year before
(T, T-1). In columns 2-6, immigrants from one different geographical area at a time are excluded from the estimating sample. In column 7, we interact the variable ln Rainfall (T, T-1) with a full set of
area dummies. Baseline and individual controls are defined as in the note to Table 3. For each column, the table reports the F-statistic (IV: F-stat) and the p-value (IV: p-value F-stat) from a joint
significance test of the excluded instrument(s). Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU survey years: 2004–2007. Standard errors: robust and clustered by country of origin
(103 clusters); *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
Illegal residence status 1 2 3 4 5 6 7
ln Rainfall (T,T-1) 0.046*** 0.039*** 0.045*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.048***
[0.007] [0.007] [0.007] [0.012] [0.008] [0.008]
ln Rainfall (T,T-1) * Eastern Europe 0.065***
[0.022]
ln Rainfall (T,T-1) * Latin America 0.052
[0.040]
ln Rainfall (T,T-1) * North Africa 0.041***
[0.005]
ln Rainfall (T,T-1) * SubSaharan Africa 0.026**
[0.011]
ln Rainfall (T,T-1) * Asia 0.043**
[0.019]
Baseline and individual controls X X X X X X X
Observations 13,672 9,809 11,572 10,734 11,339 11,234 13,672
R-squared 0.234 0.221 0.231 0.235 0.240 0.242 0.234
IV: F-stat 40.15 35.99 37.13 18.80 36.70 39.95 16.79
IV: p-value F-stat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Eastern Europe - (3863 obs.) X X X X X X
Latin America - (2100 obs.) X X X X X X
North Africa - (2938 obs.) X X X X X X
SubSaharan Africa - (2333 obs.) X X X X X X
Asia - (2438 obs.) X X X X X X
Geographical areas included:
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Table A.7 - MONTHLY CONSUMPTION - ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: ALTERNATIVE RESIDENCE DURATION - OLS AND IV ESTIMATES
Note. This table reports OLS (Panel A) and IV estimates (Panel B) of log monthly consumption on illegal residence status and other controls. The dummy Illegal residence status equals one if the
respondent lacks legal status. In Panel B, illegal residence status is instrumented with ln (Rainfall (T, T-1)) and ln (Total Quotas). In each column, we restrict the sample to individuals with a maximum
duration of residence in Italy of 5 to 15 years. Baseline and individual controls are defined as in the note to Table 3. For each column, the table reports the F-statistic (IV: F-stat) and the p-value (IV:
p-value F-stat) from a joint significance test of the excluded instrument(s). Sample: immigrants with 1–15 years of residence in Italy. ISMU survey years: 2004–2007. Standard errors: robust and
clustered by country of origin (103 clusters); *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
ysm≤5 ysm≤6 ysm≤7 ysm≤8 ysm≤9 ysm≤10 ysm≤11 ysm≤12 ysm≤13 ysm≤14 ysm≤15
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11
Illegal residence status -0.306*** -0.299*** -0.299*** -0.300*** -0.300*** -0.303*** -0.307*** -0.310*** -0.312*** -0.311*** -0.313***
[0.028] [0.027] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026] [0.026]
Illegal residence status -0.465*** -0.456*** -0.491*** -0.498*** -0.501*** -0.519*** -0.530*** -0.518*** -0.532*** -0.520*** -0.535***
[0.162] [0.133] [0.121] [0.089] [0.081] [0.066] [0.061] [0.057] [0.053] [0.051] [0.048]
IV: F-stat 27.27 33.74 44.13 57.52 59.46 54.33 57.78 65.87 76.29 83.23 89.07
IV: p-value F-stat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Baseline controls X X X X X X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X X X X X X
Observations 7,162 8,825 10,425 11,643 12,771 13,672 14,300 14,894 15,337 15,828 16,349
Panel A: OLS estimates
Panel B: IV estimates [ln (Rainfall (T,T-1)) and ln (Total Quotas)]
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TABLE A.8 – MONTHLY CONSUMPTION - ROBUSTNESS CHECKS: EXCLUDING EXTREME RAINFALL SHOCKS - OLS AND IV ESTIMATES
Note. This table reports OLS (Panel A) and IV estimates (Panel B) of log monthly consumption on illegal residence status and other controls. The dummy Illegal residence status equals one if the
respondent lacks legal status. In Panel B, illegal residence status is instrumented with ln (Rainfall (T, T-1)). We use the full sample in column 1, while in columns 2-6 we restrict the range of rainfall
shocks to +/- 2, +/- 1.5, +/- 1.25, +/- 1 and +/- 0.75 standard deviations above/below the country historical mean, respectively. Baseline and individual controls are defined as in the note to Table 3.
For each column, the table reports the F-statistic (IV: F-stat) from a joint significance test of the excluded instrument. Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU survey years:
2004–2007. Standard errors: robust and clustered by country of origin (103 clusters); *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
1 2 3 4 5 6
"+/- 2 SD" "+/- 1.5 SD" "+/- 1.25 SD" "+/- 1 SD" "+/- 0.75 SD"
Illegal residence status -0.303*** -0.304*** -0.305*** -0.307*** -0.304*** -0.305***
[0.026] [0.026] [0.027] [0.027] [0.029] [0.027]
Illegal residence status -0.578*** -0.594*** -0.492*** -0.611*** -0.321** -0.646***
[0.200] [0.204] [0.172] [0.215] [0.143] [0.232]
IV: F-stat 39.12 39.56 50.26 24.01 17.71 5.255
Baseline controls X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X
Observations 13,672 13,656 13,236 12,558 11,477 9,505
Panel A: OLS estimates
Panel B: IV estimates - ln (Rainfall (T,T-1))
Any shock Rainfall shocks range:
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TABLE A.9 – MONTHLY INCOME: FIRST STAGE ESTIMATES
Note. This table reports OLS estimates of log monthly income on unemployment rate in the province of residence and other controls. Baseline, individual and HH controls are defined as in the note to
Table 3. ln (GDP per capita) is the log of GDP per capita in the province of residence. In columns 4-9, we include the following instruments for illegal residence status: ln (Rainfall (T, T-1)) (columns 4
and 5); ln (Total Quotas) (columns 6 and 7); ln Rainfall (T, T-1) and ln (Total Quotas) (columns 8 and 9). For each column, the table reports the F-statistic (IV: F-stat) and the p-value (IV: p-value F-
stat) from a joint significance test of the excluded instrument(s). Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU survey years: 2004–2007. Standard errors: robust and clustered by
province of residence and interview year (44 clusters); *significant at 10%; **significant at 5%; ***significant at 1%.
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
unemployment rate -0.051*** -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.057*** -0.056*** -0.059*** -0.058*** -0.059*** -0.058***
[0.017] [0.017] [0.018] [0.017] [0.018] [0.018] [0.019] [0.018] [0.019]
Baseline controls X X X X X X X X X
Individual controls X X X X X X X X X
HH controls X X X X X X X X
ln(GDP per capita) X X X X
ln (Rainfall (T,T-1)) - - - X X - - X X
ln (Total Quotas) - - - - - X X X X
Observations 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672 13,672
R-squared 0.127 0.180 0.180 0.181 0.181 0.185 0.185 0.186 0.186
IV: F-stat 8.97 10.82 9.474 10.73 9.402 10.86 9.63 10.82 9.59
IV: p-value F-stat 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Instruments for Illegal residence status included:
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Table A.10 - TYPE OF ACCOMMODATION AND LEGAL STATUS
Note. This table reports the share of immigrants in each type of accommodation, by legal status. Sample: immigrants with 1–10 years of residence in Italy. ISMU survey years: 2004–2007.
Documented
immigrants
Undocumented
immigrants
owned property 14.91 1.33
rented flat: with relatives or alone 53.25 22.14
rented flat: with other immigrants 20.24 45.43
free accommodation (guest c/o relatives; homeless shelter, etc.) 5.03 11.07
c/o employer 5.98 15.33
irregular accomodation (squatting, sleeping rough, etc.) 0.28 4.43
other (hotel/hostal) 0.3 0.28
100 100
Observations 11,865 1,807
